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Multiple Job Holding, Skill Diversification, and Mobility  
 
1. Introduction  
The shift to greater labour market flexibility in recent years (Harrison, 1998) has led to lowering 
employer-employee loyalty, rising unemployment risk and far shorter job durations compared to the 
past (OECD, 1997; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995; 1999). In the face of these changes, the need on 
behalf of individuals to seek for alternative ways of ensuring employment security and a continuous 
and higher income stream has become paramount.  In addition, with rapid technological changes 
requiring continuous skills updating and lifelong learning, occupational mobility has come to 
command a higher return in modern job markets (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; European 
Commission, 2002; EurActiv, 2010).  In coping with the above volatility, a large number of workers 
have thus been required to foster an active strategy of multiple job-holding or moonlighting i (Bell et al., 
1997; Farber, 1998; Neumark, 2000).  
The interest in such active strategies becomes higher in light of the recent developments in the 
global labour markets. The 2008 financial crisis, its follow-up recessions and the austerity measures 
introduced have immense disruptive consequences for the labour markets of Europeii, with recent 
figures sketching a gloomy picture for the UK labour market (Trades Union Congress, 2012). 
Unemployment rate for the 4th trimester of 2012 has risen to 8.4%, a record high since 1995, with 
2.67 million people looking for a job. Furthermore, there is a notable increase in the prevalence of 
part-time jobs and other atypical employment. Part-time jobs, for the same period of time, rose by 
59,000 while full-time jobs fell by 50,000. In addition, temporary employment grew by 28,000 and 
involuntary temporary workers increased by 11,000. The competition in the labour market is also 
quite intense with an average of roughly 6 unemployment people per job vacancy, and in almost a 
quarter of all Local Authorities with at least 10 people chasing every vacancy.  
Given fewer long-term and more short-term jobs available in the labour market than experienced 
in earlier periods, flexible employment practices and the increased incidence of part-time 
employment have repercussions on job insecurity. These marked changes imply that job mobility 
has become more frequent while work has become less stable and secure, which in turn create a 
high-turnover labour market. The rise in atypical and precarious work patterns has created new 
poverty risks amongst the employed population.  
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Multiple job-holding can act as a means of tackling financial constraints, ensuring uninterrupted 
employment spells and as a conduit for further career progression via the accumulation of necessary 
occupational expertise.  The phenomenon of moonlighting has become an important characteristic 
of the British labour market during the time period of exacerbating labour market flexibility.  Second 
job-holding has seen an upwards movement from around 6% in 1991, and has remained on a high 
level between 1995-1999, with Böheim and Taylor (2004) reporting that moonlighting rates were 
about 8-10% in the period 1991-1998, before decreasing again to about 7% in 2001. An examination 
of the employment data over recent years suggests that since 1995 more than 1.2 million people in 
the UK have held multiple jobs (Simic and Sethi, 2002).  Importantly, the number of people holding 
second jobs increased by 68% between 1984 and 2001, a disproportionate rise compared to the 
increase in the number of people in employment over the same period of 18%. In addition, British 
women more often hold a second job than British men, with the difference in participation rates 
being stable over time. 
Despite the prevalence of moonlighting as another facet of atypical employment, the issue 
remains fairly under-researched with most available studies focusing exclusively on the determinants 
of the decision to moonlight (Perlman, 1966; Bell et al., 1997; Conway and Kimmel, 1998; Böheim 
and Taylor, 2004; Dickey and Theodossiou, 2006; Renna and Oaxaca, 2006; Wu et al. 2009). 
However, with the notable exception of Paxson and Sicherman (1996), the literature has been 
surprisingly silent with respect to the important role of multiple job-holding as facilitator of skills 
accumulation and as a determinant of the job/occupational transition process.  
Moonlighting may be an important conduit of acquisition of new skills or of gaining experience 
in alternative occupations. Taking up a second job may enable individuals to eradicate any 
information asymmetry about new occupations, to gain relevant training or acquire new credentials 
that may foster subsequent occupational mobility. A close examination of the links between 
occupational experience, the incidence of moonlighting and job/occupational mobility is thus crucial 
not only for a fuller understanding of individual income growth and career progression but for the 
purposes of future labour market policy design as well.   
The aim of this study is to examine the links between multiple job-holding and job and 
occupational mobility using a panel sample of male employees observed over 15 years (1991-2005) 
in the UK.  The empirical strategy benefits from techniques that take into consideration the dynamic 
character of moonlighting and simultaneously allow for individual-specific effects in outcome 
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equations of occupational choice, defined over non-random sub-populations of moonlighters and 
job-movers. The evidence suggests that non-transferable occupation-specific experience and 
financial constraints are contributing factors towards the selection of different occupations in the 
primary and secondary jobs by individuals who decide to moonlight. When examining job 
transitions in comparison to staying in the same job, moonlighters are twice as likely to move into 
self-employment in the next year and 35 percent more likely to transition into a new job with a new 
employer, compared to non-moonlighters. They are 17 percent less likely to become unemployed or 
inactive. Serial moonlighters are 25 percent less likely to get a new paid primary job in the next year 
(compared to temporary moonlighters). Nonetheless, individuals who switch to a different 
occupation in their second job, relative to their first one, are more likely to eventually be 
occupationally mobile in their primary job in the future. They are also more likely to transition to a 
different occupational category in their next primary occupation, either in self-employment or in 
new paid employment.  
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
available literature on the economics of multiple job-holding, drawing out any implications for job 
and occupational mobility.  Section 3 provides a theoretical framework on how moonlighting is 
related to subsequent occupational mobility, while Section 4 describes the data, and Section 5 outlines 
the empirical strategy. Section 6 discusses the main empirical results and, finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review  
The literature on multiple job-holding has identified four main potential motives behind 
moonlighting activities (Böheim and Taylor, 2004; Wu et al., 2009).  The early empirical research 
focuses primarily on the “hours constraints” motive and suggests that the predominant explanation 
for multiple job-holding is financial need, i.e. multiple-job holding is used as a survival strategy for 
low income households.  According to the standard labour-leisure model, employees may be hours 
constrained, i.e. willing to work more but not being offered the chance to do so in their primary 
occupation (Perlman, 1966).  As the willingness to work more hours is related to the provision of 
low or insufficient wages in the first job, this is also often referred to as the financial motive.  A 
number of empirical studies have found an association between the level of a worker’s earnings and 
the propensity to moonlight, showing that as the level of earnings in the primary job rises the 
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incidence of multiple job-holding declines (Hamel, 1967; Guthrie, 1969; Shisko and Rostker, 1976; 
Krishnan, 1990).  Böheim and Taylor (2004) also find evidence that a permanent contract reduces 
the chances of holding a second job, suggesting an association between job security and 
moonlighting.  However, in a recent study Robinson and Wadsworth (2007) fail to find that the 
introduction of the minimum wage in the UK had any significant impact on the decision to 
moonlight.  
In addition, employees may choose to find a second job in order to smooth their consumption, 
or as an alternative to precautionary savings, even if they are not experiencing immediate negative 
financial shocks (Guariglia and Kim, 2004).  Multiple job-holding can therefore be seen also as a 
self-insurance mechanism that individuals can use to protect themselves in the presence of 
fluctuating earnings from the first job. If the second job offers sufficient financial protection, then it 
could attenuate to some extent the need of precautionary savings. Furthermore, individuals might 
derive different sources of satisfaction from the first and the second job. In other words, job 
heterogeneity might provide a motivation to moonlight on its own, such as singing in a band during 
the evening (Böheim and Taylor, 2004).  This is the so-called heterogeneity motive (Kimmel and 
Conway, 2001; Renna and Oaxaca, 2006).   
Apart from financial constraints, the literature has identified some additional motives for 
moonlighting.  Heineck and Schwarze (2004) provide evidence that workers may take up a second 
job for other monetary benefits, acquisition of new skills or to gain experience in alternative 
occupations.  The above arguments imply that apart from securing a continuous income stream and 
hedging against the risk of primary job loss, individuals may choose to take up a second job to learn 
about new occupations, to gain training or new credentials, to engage in activities of interest to them 
which provide satisfaction not received from the primary job, or to maintain flexible work schedules 
(e.g. a woman who requires childcare may take up two part-time jobs).   
Examining the motivation for moonlighting, a large part of the literature favours the “hours 
constraints” explanation, particularly for the developed world. Little evidence has been presented on 
the view of multiple job-holding as a hedging strategy. Bell et al. (1997) find little evidence of 
behaviour of this type in the UK.  They suggest that since moonlighting is more of a 
persistent/permanent phenomenon, this constitutes evidence in favour of the job heterogeneity 
explanation.  In contrast, evidence from transition economies suggests that dual job-holding is more 
likely to be transitory and correlated with future job mobility. Guariglia & Kim (2006) find that 
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moonlighting in Russia is transitory and is generally associated with career shifts, often tending 
towards self-employment. This finding is in agreement with the view of the secondary labour market 
or the informal sector acting as a potential effective incubator for setting up new self-employed 
businesses, by fostering the development of new human capital (Levenson and Maloney, 1998; 
Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2011; 2013).  
The literature also highlights some other interesting patterns governing the moonlighting 
phenomenon. Alden (1971) finds a higher incidence of multiple job-holding in the rural regions of 
the UK. He also shows that self-employment is the predominant form of employment in a 
secondary job.  Lundberg (1995) investigates moonlighting in the context of a job with amenities 
and argues that multiple job-holding can be explained by individuals having some emotional or other 
attachment to a specific sector or job that would lead them to turn down offers of higher earnings in 
other sectors.  Krishnan (1990) explores how a husband’s decision to moonlight is affected by his 
wife’s decision to work, and finds that increased participation by wives deters multiple job-holding.  
Kimmel and Powell (1999) find that gender and marital status also appear to affect the decision of 
multiple job-holding, with women, those who are never married and young individuals more likely 
to take up second jobs.  Alden and Spooner (1982) highlight gender differences in the preferences 
over the type of second job, with females tending to be paid employees, as opposed to men who are 
mostly self-employed in their second job.  In contrast, Averett (2001) finds no substantive 
differences in the factors that lead men and women to moonlight. 
 
3. Moonlighting and Occupational Skills 
Recent works in the skill portfolio literature provide evidence for the importance of skills that are 
acquired via experience and can be applied to different settings. Human capital accumulates at the 
firm level through education, learning-by-doing and learning-by interacting, but may also be acquired 
externally (Robinson, 2010). Lazear’s (2009) skill-weights approach assumes that all skills are general 
in nature but the combination of single skills varies from firm to firm. Thus, specificity can be 
entailed in any type of occupational training, as only the combination of single skills makes them 
specific. Acemoglou and Autor (2011) emphasize that the trends in modern labour markets require 
the distinction between skills and tasks. A task is a unit of work activity that produces output, while 
a skill is a workers endowment of capabilities for performing various tasks. The distinction becomes 
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particularly relevant when workers of a given skill level can perform a variety of tasks and change the 
set of tasks that they perform in response to changes in labour market conditions and technology 
(Robinson, 2010).  
Dual job-holding can be seen as a skill acquisition or even a specialization devise, improving 
expected income and at the same time protecting workers from a greater down side risk of not 
locating the more desired employment opportunity in a bad draw. The return to investment in a 
particular skill is increasing in its subsequent rate of utilization, if investment costs are independent 
of how acquired skills are employed (Rosen, 1983). Moonlighters can be thought to be preparing for 
a job transition, acquiring the skills that match the existing skill portfolio of the next occupation. 
Indeed, labour mobility is often regarded as a key mechanism through which knowledge diffuses, 
and the occupational productivity profile can be expected to vary between different jobs.  
In an interesting unifying framework, Paxson and Sicherman (1996) introduce a stochastic 
dynamic model where the decisions to take a second job and change primary job are taken 
simultaneously.  According to the authors, the “hours constraints” explanation can lead to a dynamic 
process of moonlighting and job mobility. Workers who want to work more search for a portfolio 
of jobs that provide desirable bundles of characteristics.  They may then use dual job-holding to 
learn about new occupations or to gain training. Moonlighting can thus facilitate the process of 
transition to a different occupation.  
As shown by Shaw (1987), occupational change occurs when there is a positive difference 
between the present value of the current and an alternative occupational pathway. She illustrates that 
the degree of transferability of skills across occupations is an important determinant of occupational 
choice, with a higher degree of transferability being associated with a greater probability of 
individuals moving to another job. This is because the immediate income loss that individuals will 
experience when moving from occupation i (primary job at time t-1) to occupation j (subsequent 
primary job at time t) will be smaller, as expressed by the condition: 
∆= 𝛾𝑖𝑗𝐶𝑖 − 𝐶𝑖 = (𝛾𝑖𝑗 − 1)𝐶𝑖  (1) 
where, 𝛾𝑖𝑗 is the proportion of investment in occupation i which is transferred in occupation j, and 
𝐶𝑖 is the accumulated human capital specific to occupation i. Extending Shaw’s framework to allow 
for individuals to engage in secondary job-holding, similar conditions for the lost occupational skills 
of the past investments can be derived as shown below: 
8 
 
 ∆1= (1 − 𝛾
𝑖𝑗)𝐶𝑖  (2) 
 
∆2= (1 − 𝛾
𝑘𝑗)𝐶𝑘 = (1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗)(𝑐𝑘 + 𝛾𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑖)  (3) 
where, equation 2 refers to people who do the same occupation (i) in both their primary and 
secondary job and equation 3 to individuals who are in a different occupation (k) in their second job 
relative to their primary job (i)iii. As above, 𝛾𝑘𝑗  and 𝛾𝑖𝑘 refer to the proportion of investment in 
occupation k (i) which is transferred in occupation j (k), respectively. In addition, 𝐶𝑘 is the 
accumulated human capital specific to occupation k, which is defined as the sum of the current 
investment in occupational skills k (𝑐𝑘) and the proportion of occupational skills i that are 
transferable to occupation k (𝛾𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑖).  
Comparing equations (2) and (3), it is evident that the human capital loss when deciding to do a 
different occupation in the second job relative to the primary one will be smaller than the associated 
loss for those individuals who do not diversity their occupational skills portfolioiv, when:  
𝛾𝑘𝑗 > 𝛾𝑖𝑗 ⇒ ∆1> ∆2  (4) 
This condition leads to the following proposition, which is empirically explored in the next sections: 
PROPOSITION: Diversifying occupational skills portfolio in the second job, relative to the current primary job, 
increases the probability of moving to a new primary occupation, when associated with greater transferability of skills. 
 
4. The Data 
This study uses fifteen waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1991-2005)v to examine 
the links between occupational experience, multiple job-holding, job mobility and occupational 
choice.  The BHPS is a nationally representative household survey providing rich information on 
individual demographic, socioeconomic and work-related characteristics. Importantly, it identifies 
individuals who hold more than one job by asking “Do you earn any money from (a second job) odd jobs or 
from work that you might do from time to time (apart from your main job)?”  
Figure 1 plots rates of dual job-holding by year vis-à-vis the official rates of unemployment, 
measured both in terms of benefit claimant rates per government region and local unemployment 
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rates.  The figure verifies that women are more likely to hold multiple jobs than men (by almost two 
percentage points).  The male rates are between 6.5% and 10.5%, increasing in the first half of the 
panel and reaching a maximum in 1997.  The trend declines after that year, reaching a figure close to 
6.5% by 2005.  Echoing the evidence on the pro-cyclicality of moonlighting in the U.S (Partridge, 
2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2009), the BHPS dual job-holding line also seems to parallel 
the unemployment line quite closely, with a rising trend until 1997 that is reversed thereafter. 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The empirical analysis of the paper employs an unbalanced sample of males in paid employment, 
aged between 18 and 60 at the time of the interview.  The reason why the male sample is considered is 
to facilitate the examination of a homogeneous group of workers. It is well documented that men and 
women overall exhibit quite different labour market behaviour. In particular, women's life course 
trajectories are much more heterogeneous than men's. Their labour supply has been found to be more 
elastic, not only with regard to family events such as marriage or childbirth, but also regarding changes 
in the wage rate and non-labour income (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Evers et al., 2008). Moreover, 
the literature on job mobility patterns and search behaviour has highlighted significant gender 
differences. Women on average exhibit a lesser commitment to labour market activity, they are 
relatively less mobile than men (Theodossiou, 2002), and they are less likely to be engaged in on-the-
job search aiming at voluntary job mobility compared to men (Parson, 1991; van Ophem, 1991; Keith 
and McWilliams, 1999). The primary reason for these gender differences in labour market behaviour 
are the societal constraints associated with women’s dominant role in childcare. Hersch and Stratton 
(1997) show that women, especially married women, spend three times more time engaged in 
household activities and are substantially more prepared to quit their job for a family-related reason 
than men are (Keith and McWilliams, 1997; Theodossiou, 2002). Furthermore, women are more likely 
to undertake secondary job tasks for immediate financial reasons or due to family responsibilities 
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 2009). 
An additional criterion for inclusion in the analysis is the presence of males in the sample for at 
least three years, which is employed in order to enable the use of dynamic models. The average 
statistical life in the sample is 9.7 years.  Finally, in the remainder of this study, all dual job-holders 
with a secondary hourly wage greater than £150 or smaller than £1 are dropped, in order to exclude 
outliers and unpaid family workers and ensure comparability with international studies of dual job 
holdingvi. The sample is comprised of 5,583 individuals (37,209 observations).  There are 2,600 spells 
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of dual job-holding in the data, by 1,080 individuals.  This is suggestive of the persistent nature of 
multiple job-holding in the U.K (Bell et al., 1997; Böheim and Taylor, 2004), as a large number of 
individuals are engaged in a second job for more than one year during the sample life.  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for primary and secondary job characteristics in the sample.  On 
average, 7% of the employed male sample is occupied in a paid second job. The average gross 
monthly salary in the primary occupation is £1,340 for an average of 39 hours of work per week.  The 
average monthly salary in the second job appears to be £231 for an average of 6 hours per week.  
Both the figures for earnings and hours of work in the second job entail large standard deviations. 
The median hourly wage is £6.2 for the primary job and £7 for the secondary job (the earnings figures 
are in 1991 values, deflated using the ONS GDP deflator).  
A first examination of the 1-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes in the 
primary and secondary jobs suggests that the proportion of people who work as “Managers & 
administrators”, “Plant & machine operatives” and in “Clerical & secretarial occupations” in their 
secondary occupation is significantly lower compared to the respective groups in the primary 
occupation.  There appears to be a higher incidence of lower-skilled occupations in the second job, 
such as “Associate professional & technical”, “Personal & protective service” and “Other 
occupations”.  It is thus of great interest to examine the factors that affect the decision of individuals 
whether to conduct the same or different types of jobs between their primary and secondary 
employment.    
In terms of occupational choices in the 2nd job, the figures in Table 1 suggest that 68% of the 
moonlighters choose to do a different occupation than their primary job. The figure is obtained 
using 1-digit SOC classification codes, and the figures for different occupation in the second job 
using 2-digit and 3-digit codes are 79% and 84% respectively.  50.5% of these dual job-holders are in 
paid employment in their second job, while 49.5% are in self-employment. 49.1% hold a second job 
for two consecutive years (serial moonlighters).   
Panel B of Table 1 presents selected primary and secondary job characteristics distinguishing 
between the sub-samples of individuals who moonlight at a different and at the same occupation as 
in their primary job. Three sets of distinctions are presented, at the 1-digit, the 2-digit and the 3-digit 
SOC level, respectively. It is shown that individuals moonlighting in different occupation are earning 
less on average in their primary job. Moreover, they are working more hours in their secondary job, 
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and are earning less on average. Furthermore, they are less likely to be self-employed in their 
secondary occupation. These patterns are consistent at all 1-, 2-, and 3-digit SOC distinctions.   
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 indicates that dual job-holders are earning significantly lower (hourly or monthly) wages in 
their primary job.  Moreover, 13.2% of dual job-holders are found in the low-paid group, defined as 
those earning less than two thirds of the median earnings in the sample.  The respective figure is 
7.9% for those employed solely in one job.  Single job-holders are also more likely to have a higher 
household income and are less likely to be “relatively poor” (i.e. report equivalised household 
income less than two thirds of the sample median).  Dual job-holders are less likely to be married 
and to have an employed partner if married.  They are younger on average and have lower labour 
market experience, occupational-specific experiencevii and job tenure.  They work less hours on 
average in their primary occupation, both in terms of normal weekly hours and paid overtime.  
However, they are more likely to want to work more hours in that job, which is indicative of hours 
constraints.   
A raw inspection of job transitions suggests that 3.8% of dual job-holders switch to self-
employment as a primary job in the next year, compared to 1.9% of non-moonlighters. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, 13.7% of moonlighters move to a new 
job with a new employer, compared to 11% of non-moonlighters, and are less likely to remain in the 
same position with the same employer. These patterns suggest that there is a relationship between 
dual job-holding and job mobility.  It is important to notice, though, that the rates of transition to 
unemployment do not differ significantly between dual and single job-holders (1.9% and 2.2% 
respectively).  
In terms of occupational choices, the sample averages in Panel (C) of Table 2 suggest that those 
dual job-holders doing the same occupation in their primary and secondary job are more likely to be 
wealthier and to have higher job tenure and occupational experience. Apart from Managers and 
Administrators, the groups more likely to diversify between the two jobs are those in unskilled 
occupations in their primary jobs (i.e. clerical & secretarial, plant and machine operatives, sales and other 
occupations).  In the first instance, there appears to be a small positive association between the 
incidence of dual job holding and occupational diversification in the next year (significant at the 10% 
level at the 3-digit SOC). However, occupational choice in the second job and that of the next 
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occupation appear to be related, with individuals diversifying in their second job being significantly 
more likely to do a different job in the next year, if they transition to new employment or a new 
position.  
 
5. Statistical Methodology 
In investigating the determinants of the occupational choice at the second job, and the implications 
of the latter for subsequent job and occupational mobility, a number of important statistical issues 
arise that can be conceptualized as two distinct individual decisions.  First, the analysis focuses on 
modeling the discrete binary choice of taking up a secondary occupation that is different from the 
one in the primary job.  This is done in order to examine how such occupational choices are related 
to the various motives for moonlighting that were described in Section 2 above. Second, the interest 
turns to examining the potential links between the primary-secondary occupational choices of 
individuals at time period t and their subsequent labour market mobility and occupational decisions 
in the next period (t+1). This analysis enables the investigation of the proposition derived in section 
3. For both set of issues the econometric methodology pays particular attention to the potential 
incidental selection problem that arises, given that in the first case the sample is comprised of dual 
job-holders only, whilst in the second the sample is a non-random representation of individuals who 
have switched jobs.  The next two sections describe the statistical methodology employed in the 
study.      
5.1 The Profile of the Dual Job-Holder and Occupational Choice 
Following the decision to take-up multiple jobs, individuals are likely to engage in a discrete choice 
of whether to select a secondary occupation that is different from the one in the primary job.  On 
the one hand, undertaking a similar occupation in a second job as in the primary one may allow 
individuals to benefit from the specialization that may result from the accumulation of occupational-
specific skills. This may constitute an optimal response, especially in the face of financial constraints 
that may be the motivating factor underlying the decision to moonlight.  On the other hand, 
performing a secondary job that deviates from the original one may foster the building-up of a 
different stock of skills that may encourage the transition to a different occupation in the future.    
The occupational change choice can be examined within a human capital investment framework, 
where individuals weight the benefits of potential earnings and non-pecuniary returns and costs of 
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training and forgone earnings or wage premia associated with accumulated occupation-specific skills. 
The individual will invest in changing occupations only if there are net benefits. An occupational 
change entails a short-term financial loss (Parrado et al., 2007; Kampourov and Manovskii, 2008) 
related to the loss of occupation-specific human capital. However, such changes often lead to 
positive long-term effects when are related to career changes and shifts to occupations that offer 
higher or faster wage growth. Individuals’ wealth can partially affect occupational mobility decisions, 
since given imperfect capital markets, resources for investing in oneself will not be equally accessible 
to all people. Wealth in this case is expected to absorb the short-term financial distress/losses related 
to forgone earnings and training costs. 
This decision can be formally represented as follows:  
𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑚)𝑖𝑡 = 1{x𝑖𝑡
′ θ + α𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0},   𝑖 = 1, … , N; 𝑡 = 2, … , T  (5) 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1{𝑚𝑖𝑡
∗ = z𝑖𝑡
′ β + +𝜉𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0}   (6) 
where in equation (5), the main equation of interest, the dependent variable, 𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑚)𝑖𝑡, is a binary 
variable that represents secondary job choices. We utilize three distinct choice variables, i.e. three 
binary variables that take the value of one for those who do an secondary occupation that is 
different from the one in their primary job (based on 1-digit, 2-digit and 3-digit SOC level  
respectively), and zero otherwise. 𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑚)𝑖𝑡 is assumed to depend on a vector of regressors, 𝒙, and 
on a composite error term, 𝑣𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , where 𝛼𝑖 is a term capturing unobserved individual-
specific effects with 𝐸(𝛼𝑖|𝑥𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is a random error term with 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = 0.  
Importantly, 𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑚)𝑖𝑡 is only observed if 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1, where 𝑚𝑖𝑡 is an indicator (selection) variable for 
individual i being a dual job-holder at time period t, 𝒛 is a vector of explanatory variables (𝒛 > 𝒙 for 
identification purposes) and 𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is a composite error term with 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2), 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑧𝑖𝑡) = 0.  The time-invariant fixed effects term, 𝜂𝑖 , is assumed to account for potential 
omitted variable bias in the model, 𝐸(𝜂𝑖|𝑧𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, and is also responsible for serial correlation in 𝑐𝑖𝑡. 
Equations (5) and (6) take into account a number of important elements that are likely to 
characterize the economic problem that individuals face.  First, the term 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 is included in 
equation (6) to capture the effect of state dependence which has been identified as a typical 
characteristic of the decision to moonlight (Bell et al., 1997; Böheim and Taylor, 2004). Second, it 
has been deemed necessary to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the form of time-
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invariant fixed effects (𝛼𝑖 in equation 5 and 𝜂𝑖 in equation 6), since there are important unobserved 
factors that may affect both the decision to moonlight and the subsequent occupational choice of a 
secondary job.  For instance, it may be argued that less risk-averse individuals are more likely to 
engage in multiple job-holding, or to select a different occupational track as a secondary job choice. 
Third, a correction for potential sample selection bias is required in order to obtain consistent 
parameters in equation 5, since estimation of the main outcome equation is conditional on the 
potentially non-random subpopulation of those individuals who decide to moonlight (equation 6) 
(Heckman, 1979).   
In order to address the above issues, Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) 
have proposed a suitable Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimation procedure.  
Specifically, following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) it is initially assumed that the 
correlation between 𝜂𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖𝑡 can be parameterized via a linear relationship, 𝜂𝑖 = 𝑧?̅?
′𝛿 + 𝜔𝑖, where 
𝜔𝑖 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜔
2 ), 𝐸(𝜔𝑖|𝑧𝑖𝑡, 𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 0 and 𝑧?̅? are the means over the sample period of all 
exogenous variables.  Equation (6) is therefore expressed as:  
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1{z𝑖𝑡
′ β + 𝜉𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑧?̅?
′𝛿 + 𝜔𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0},   𝑖 = 1, … , N; 𝑡 = 2, … , T   (7) 
As argued by Chamberlain (1984), estimation of the likelihood function requires an assumption 
about the relationship between the initial observations, 𝑦𝑖1, and 𝜔𝑖. Assuming linearity 𝜔𝑖 = 𝜔0 +
𝜔1𝑦𝑖1 + 𝜓𝑖 , Wooldridge (2005) has shown that a procedure that entails the addition of the initial 
value, 𝑚𝑖1, and the means of the time-varying exogenous regressors into the main specification (5) 
can lead to consistent estimation parameters:viii 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1{z𝑖𝑡
′ β + 𝜉𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑧?̅?
′𝛿 + 𝜔0 + 𝜔1𝑚𝑖1 + 𝜓𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0},   𝑖 = 1, … , N; 𝑡 = 2, … , T (8) 
Wooldridge postulates further that since the errors in the selection equation, 𝜛𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔0 + 𝜓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are independent of 𝑧?̅? and 𝜛𝑖𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜚
2) and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑧?̅?, 𝜛𝑖𝑡) = 𝜌𝑡𝜛𝑖𝑡, the conditional 
expectation of 𝛼𝑖 can be expressed as a linear function of 𝑧?̅? and 𝜛𝑖𝑡 as follows: 
𝐸(𝛼𝑖|𝑧?̅?, 𝜛𝑖) = 𝑧?̅?𝜗 + (𝜙𝑡+𝜌𝑡)𝐸(𝜛𝑖𝑡|𝑧?̅?, 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1)  (9) 
which results in the following model of the outcome equation: 
𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑚)𝑖𝑡 = 1{x𝑖𝑡
′ θ + 𝑧?̅?𝜗 + 𝑙𝑡𝜆(𝐻𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0}   (10) 
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where 𝑙𝑡 = (𝜙𝑡+𝜌𝑡), 𝐻𝑖𝑡 = (z𝑖𝑡
′ β + 𝜉𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑧?̅?
′𝛿 + 𝜔1𝑚𝑖1) and 𝜆(𝐻𝑖𝑡) =
𝜑(𝐻𝑖𝑡)
Φ(𝐻𝑖𝑡)
 is the inverse 
Mill’s ratio with φ(.) denoting the standard normal density and (.) is the standard cumulative 
normal distribution function. 
For the estimation of equation (10), Wooldridge recommends that separate probit regressions are 
estimated on the selection equation (8) per each year t from which 𝜆(𝐻𝑖𝑡) is obtained (correcting the 
standard errors for robustness).  In the second step, equation (10) may then be consistently 
estimated by a pooled OLS regression (with bootstrapped standard errors).ix   
5.2 Dual Job-Holding, Job Mobility and Occupational Choice in the New Job 
The choice of primary and secondary job is likely to significantly affect the mobility of individuals 
via the accumulation of occupation-specific skills that it entails.  As shown by Shaw (1987), in a 
world of perfect information the probability of employer or occupational change increases with the 
transferability of human capital.  Furthermore, imperfect knowledge of the “match” between one’s 
abilities and the job requirements is likely to facilitate a move to an unrelated occupation.  An 
additional job, especially one that is distinct to the primary occupation, is therefore likely to enhance 
the prospect of labour market mobility, by affecting the available stock of occupation-specific skills 
and/or by alleviating the uncertainty regarding the worker-job match.  
The focus of interest therefore now turns to examining how the occupational diversification 
between primary and secondary jobs at time period t affects the subsequent labour market decisions 
of individuals in the next period (t+1), both in terms of their mobility to a new primary job and with 
respect to the occupational choice made.  A similar framework to the one used in Section 5.1 is 
employed: 
𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑝)𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1{x𝑖𝑡
′ θ + α𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0},   𝑖 = 1, … , N; 𝑡 = 1, … , T − 1  (11) 
𝑝𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1{𝑝𝑖(𝑡+1)
∗ = z𝑖𝑡
′ β + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0}   (12) 
where 𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑝)𝑖(𝑡+1) is now a binary variable taking the value of one if individuals in a new primary 
job at time t+1 are doing an occupation different from their primary job in the previous period (t). 
Differences in occupations are examined at all 1-digit, 2-digit and 3-digit SOC levels. As before, an 
incidental truncation problem arises as this variable is only observed for those individuals who 
decided to change their primary employment, i.e. 𝑝𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1. The Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina 
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and Wooldridge (2005) methodology is utilized again so that the estimation of equations (11) and 
(12) proceeds as followsx:  
𝑜𝑐𝑐(𝑝)𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1{x𝑖𝑡
′ θ + 𝑧?̅?𝜗 + 𝑙𝑡𝜆(𝐻𝑖𝑡) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0}  (13) 
p𝑖(𝑡+1) = 1{z𝑖𝑡
′ β + 𝑧?̅?
′𝛿 + 𝜓𝑖 + ε𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0}    (14) 
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1 The Profile of the Multiple Job-Holder 
The results presented in Table 3 are based on estimation of equation (8), the selection equation 
identifying the likelihood of individuals engaging in multiple job-holding. Apart from the terms that 
account for state dependence and the initial condition (Moonlighting(t-1), Moonlighting(Year1)), the 
specification controls for the local unemployment rate (by administrative region), job satisfaction,  
and the logarithms of equivalised household income in the year prior to the survey, labour market 
experience, occupation-specific experience, job tenure, weekly working hours, paid overtime hours, 
and number of children. Moreover, the list of explanatory variables includes dummy variables 
capturing whether an individual wants to work more or less hours in the primary job, 
marital/cohabitation status and partner’s employment status, education, and occupation in the 
primary job (1-digit SOC codes). Finally, additional variables are included that control for private 
sector, permanent job, promotion prospects, and annual earnings increments in the primary job, 
along with dummy variables for industry, region and wave. A convenient way of interpreting the 
coefficients is to consider the estimated joint effect of the mean terms of the variables (Mundlak 
terms) and the level variables as the “permanent” effect of the regressors on the decision to hold a 
second jobxi. The coefficients on the level of the variables represent instead the response to a 
“transitory” change in these variables.  
Overall the results highlight some important patterns regarding the motives of the decision to 
moonlight. First, there is significant evidence in favour of the financial or hours-constraint motive, 
as it is clear that the transitory effect of individuals’ household income in the last year exerts a 
negative effect on the probability of currently holding a second job.  Furthermore, individuals who 
permanently prefer to work more hours in their present primary job are more likely to hold a second 
job compared to those who are content with their working hours. Individuals who would like to 
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work less hours in their current job are less likely to moonlight.  In addition, although the total 
number of contracted hours of work in the primary job does not affect the moonlighting decision, 
the number of paid overtime hours, which can act as an alternative response of individuals to 
financial constraints, is found to have a negative and significant effect on multiple job-holdingxii. 
Individuals with promotion prospects in their primary job and those who receive annual increments 
in their salary are also less likely to have a second job. 
At a more aggregate level the positive effect of the current local unemployment level suggests that 
individuals respond to a negative demand shock, such as an increase in the unemployment rate, by 
obtaining a second job as an insurance shield against increased labour market uncertainty. Job 
satisfaction is found to exert a negative transitory effect on the likelihood of moonlighting, signifying 
that individuals who become less satisfied with their jobs are more likely to moonlight. This could be 
indicative of the intension to move into a new job once the opportunity arisesxiii. Though no 
temporary effects of the variables marital status, employment status of the spouse, and number of 
children are found, presumably due to their low variation over time, their mean effects are 
statistically significant. This suggests that they exert a permanent effect on the decision to hold a 
second job. Single people are found to be more likely to engage in moonlighting. A greater number 
of children, presumably due to the increased associated financial burden, is found to exert a positive 
impact on the decision to hold a second job.  Furthermore, educationalxiv and occupational 
differences appear to explain very little of the variation in the decision to hold an additional job, 
although the evidence is indicative that lower-skilled occupations are more conducive to 
moonlighting.  Areas in the south appear to have the highest instances of dual-job holding.    
The estimated model includes controls for both the multiple job-holding status of the individuals 
in the previous year as well as in the year they first appeared in the sample.  Both variables are 
estimated to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the decision to hold a second job in 
the current period, suggesting that the incidence of multiple job-holding contains a permanent 
labour market element.  Given the evidence of its persistent dynamic nature, it is difficult to 
rationalize that multiple job-holding is a temporary individual response to financial shocks.  
Nonetheless, the permanency of moonlighting is consistent with previous findings of the literature 
that have showed that low-paid workers (who are more likely to engage in multiple job-holding) are 
typically trapped in a “low-pay/no pay” vicious cycle (Webb et al., 1996; Machin, 1999; Stewart, 
1999; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999; Dickens, 2000; TUC, 2007).       
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Finally, the significant negative permanent effect of a constructed measure of occupation-specific 
experience (Zangelidis, 2008a) implies that employees with a greater set of specific skills, who are 
likely to enjoy higher (wage) returns from a first job (Zangelidis, 2008a and 2008b; Kambourov and 
Manovskii, 2009a; Williams, 2009), will be less in need of performing a secondary job.  Interestingly, 
the level effect of tenure (transitory effect) implies that as individuals gain seniority in their current 
employment they are more likely to hold a second job. This finding may be potentially explained by 
the unwillingness of individuals to search for a second job in the initial or probationary period of 
employment.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
6.2 Multiple Job-Holding and Occupational Choice  
Conditional on the determinants of dual job-holding shown in Table 3, the analysis now turns to the 
occupational choices of those who decide to have a second job i.e. the estimation of Equation (10).   
The results of linear regressions are presented in Table 4xv. The list of explanatory variables is 
similar to that of Table 3, with the exception of the dynamic terms, in accordance to the 
methodology described in Section 5.1 for the occupational choice model. In addition, individuals who 
hold a second job for financial reasons are likely to compare the available employment opportunities 
they have and choose the one with the highest potential in terms of earnings capacity, in accordance 
with the prediction of standard models of occupational choice (e.g. Freeman, 1971; Boskin, 1974; 
Berger, 1988; Montmarquette et al., 2002). In order to capture this decision, a new variable in the 
dataset has thus been created that compares the wages that the individual is likely to receive from his 
current occupation with the predicted earnings from the best alternative occupation. The latter is 
defined as the occupation that individuals are most likely to do as part of their primary employment, 
besides the one that they are currently employed in (see the description in the Appendix for details). 
As expected, the estimated coefficient of this variable is negative and significant at the 1-digit and 
the 2-digit SOC level, suggesting that individuals who have higher earnings possibilities in their 
current occupation, relative to other viable options, are less likely to choose a different occupation in 
their second job.  
Our three measures of occupational choice in the second job are binary variables capturing 
difference in occupational codes compared to the primary job, at the 1-digit, the 2-digit and the 3-
digit SOC level respectivelyxvi. When occupational changes are observed at the broader more 
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aggregate 1-digit level, they can be regarded as changes of great magnitude. Occupational mobility at 
the 1-digit level is more likely to be observed when individuals want to acquire a different set of 
skills and explore alternative career pathways rather than when they want to increase their labour 
income through a second job. In contrast, the influence of labour market conditions is expected to 
be more evident at the 2-digit or 3-digit level of secondary occupational choice complementarity. 
Therefore, individuals who moonlight for financial reasons are expected to primarily remain in the 
same occupation, or move to a similar occupation where they can still use their skills and expertise 
(using the notation from Section 3, 𝛾𝑖𝑘 close to one) in order to maximise their earnings capacity. 
Whereas, individuals who seek to expand their portfolio of skills have to bare these short-term 
income losses. Wealth can ease the financial pressure in this case, so affluent individuals may be 
more likely to explore different occupations and new career pathways than those who have more 
demanding financial commitments. 
As discussed before, a measure of occupational-specific experience has thus been included in the 
regression as a control variable (Zangelidis, 2008a).  The findings confirm a priori expectations, as 
individuals with lengthier occupational experience in their primary job are less likely to choose a 
different occupation in their second job. Interestingly, accumulated labour market experience is 
found to have the opposite (positive) effect only at the 3-digit level.  One plausible explanation for 
the latter result may be that individuals with lengthier overall working experience have better 
knowledge of the labour market and better information regarding employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, the length of total labour market experience may be regarded as a proxy of the level of 
accumulated general, highly transferable, skills.   
Household characteristics are important determinants of individuals’ occupational choice in the 
second job. Specifically, married or cohabitating individuals (particularly those whose spouse is not 
employed) are estimated to be less likely to do a different occupation in their second job, compared 
to that in their primary one. This finding may be interpreted as evidence that individuals with 
increased financial commitments are more likely to choose as their second job an occupation that 
that they are familiar with, as a means of increasing their earnings capacity.   
Workplace characteristics of the primary job are also found to affect the occupational choice in 
the second job.  In addition, individuals with a low level of education, compared to those with a 
University degree or above, are found to be less likely to do a secondary occupation different to the 
one in their primary job (at the 1-digit SOC level). Finally, the majority of the individuals employed 
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in occupations other than Managers and Administrators are less likely to choose a different 
occupation in their second job.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Overall, the above findings imply that individuals in low-skilled jobs and/or those facing 
increased family commitments or financial constraints are more likely to select a similar occupation 
in the second job as in their primary one. This is presumably to exploit the higher earnings 
opportunities that their non-transferable occupational experience secures.  The contrary holds for 
those individuals who enjoy a relative sense of financial security, who can therefore “afford” to 
select different occupational streams in their secondary employment that satisfy their intrinsic 
preferences.  
6.3 Multiple Job-Holding and Job Mobility  
Focusing on the selection equation (14) first, particular interest is paid to the following five possible 
labour market outcomes concerning the primary employment: (1) staying in the same job; (2) 
becoming self-employed; (3) getting a new salary job; (4) getting a new position with the current 
employer; and (5) becoming unemployed or inactive. The estimation methodology is a set of 
random effects probit modelsxvii. Specifically, the four separate models estimate the probability of 
individuals moving to each of the four possible labour market outcomes (2),(3), (4), and (5) relative 
to a comparison group of those who remain in the same job (1).  
Table 5 the results of main interest from the estimation of primary job mobility models with 
moonlighting and secondary job choices as the main explanatory variables in separate models. In 
Panel A of Table 5, it is found that individuals who have a second job are more likely to become 
self-employed in the next period than to remain in the same job (column 1). The magnitude of the 
effect of moonlighting is close to 100 percent, given the predicted probability of the model. There is 
also a positive relationship between moonlighting and getting a new job with a different employer, 
with the magnitude of the effect being in the order of 35 percent (column 2).  In addition, multiple 
job holding is found to exert a negative impact on the probability of becoming unemployed or 
inactive (17 percent). The results of the full model of Panel A are presented in Appendix Table 
A2xviii. 
Panel B presents estimates in which moonlighting in a different job from the primary occupation is 
controlled for. We incorporate this variable capturing the difference in period t in three distinct sets 
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of specifications, i.e. difference at the 1-digit SOC (columns 5-8 ), at the 2-digit (columns 9-12) and 
the 3-digit (columns 13-16), respectively. The reference group comprises of individuals who 
moonlight in the same job as the primary occupation. A dummy variable for non-moonlighters is also 
incorporated in the specifications.  
It is evident from Panel B that moonlighting in a different occupation in period t is positively 
associated with moving into a new job with a new employer in the period t+1. Moreover, it is 
negatively associated with moving into a new position with the same employer. The effects are of 
greater magnitude and significance when the main explanatory variable captures 2-digit and 3-digit 
SOC differences. For instance, individuals doing a different secondary occupation at the 2-digit level 
are some 15 percent more likely to move into a new job, and 27 percent less likely to move into a 
new position with the same employer (compared to individuals doing the same secondary 
occupation at the 2-digit SOC level), rather than stay in the same job. The results in Panel C suggest 
that serial moonlighters are 25 percent less likely to move into a new job with a new employer, 
rather than stay into the same job with the same employer.  
The findings here suggest a positive association between second job-holding and secondary job 
choice and subsequent job mobility in the primary employment. A priori however, it is not clear 
what the direction of causality in this relationship should be. Individuals who want to change jobs 
and explore new career pathways may use secondary employment as means of obtaining the 
necessary skills in order to facilitate this transition. In that case, the decision to change careers results 
to second job-holding. It may also be the case though that people who hold a second job eventually 
are driven to a new primary job and a different career, despite the fact that initially they did not 
intend to. Therefore, second job-holding could also lead to future job mobility. The empirical 
framework enables us to identify this positive association between dual job-holding, secondary job 
occupation choice and future job mobility, but not to directly explore the direction of causalityxix. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
6.4 Multiple Job-Holding and Occupational Choice in the New Job 
As the estimates in Table 5 highlight the importance of dual job-holding for job mobility, the issue is 
now further explored by examining the occupational choices individuals make when changing jobs 
(either by becoming self-employed, getting a new job, or obtaining a new position with their current 
employer). The dependent variable captures different primary occupation in period t+1 compared to 
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period t (in sets of three specifications, i.e. showing difference at the 1-digit SOC level, the 2-digit 
and the 3-digit respectively). As before, attention is paid on the effect of the main explanatory 
variable, i.e. holding two jobs in period t (in Panel A),  the occupational choice in the second job in 
period t (in Panel B), measured as different secondary occupation), and serial moonlighting (in Panel 
C).  
The occupational choice model in equation (13) is estimated separately for those who (a) become 
self-employed, (b) get a new job with a new employer or (c) a new position with the same employer 
at period t+1, with the job mobility models of columns I-IV in Table 5 serving as first stage 
regressions that correct for the potential incidental truncation biasxx.  The control group comprises 
of individuals staying in the same job. Linear probability models are thus estimated in the second 
stage, incorporating the inverse Mills ratios obtained in the first stage. The dependent variable takes 
the value 1 if individuals work in a different occupation in (a) self-employment (section I); (b) new job 
with a new employer (section II); and (c) new position with the same employer (section III).  The 
estimates for the variables of main interest are presented in Table 6. In Panel A it is shown that 
moonlighting does not exert a significant impact on occupational diversification in the next year 
(either in self-employment or a new job or a new position). The full estimates for columns 1, 4 and 7 
are illustrated in Panel B of the Appendix Table A2.  
Panel B presents estimates of occupational choice in period t+1 controlling for the moonlighting 
occupational choices of the previous period. What becomes evident is that the occupational choices 
that individuals make as multiple job-holders can play an important role in terms of affecting their 
selected occupations in their new primary employment. In particular, individuals who carry out a 
different occupation in the primary and secondary job at period t are more likely to perform a different 
occupation in the new primary job at period t+1, either in self-employment or in a new job with a 
new employer. In all specifications, the group that is the least likely to make a transition into a 
different occupational category comprises of moonlighters doing the same occupation as in their 
primary job. Non dual job-holders are more likely to transition into a new occupational category in 
the next year, compared to moonlighters in the same occupations as in their primary job.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The associations between occupational choice in the second job and that of the new job are 
significant at all SOC digit levels for individuals switching into a different job in self-employment or 
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a new job. They are marginally significant at the 2-digit SOC for individuals switching into a new 
position with the same employer. Specifically, moonlighters in a different 1-digit SOC code are more than 
twice as likely to transition to a different 1-digit SOC code in self-employment in the next year and 
some 36 percent more likely to transition to a different 1-digit SOC code in a new paid job. 
Moonlighters in a different 2-digit SOC code are 45 percent more likely to transition to a different 2-digit 
SOC code in self-employment in the next year and some 37 percent more likely to transition to a 
different 2-digit SOC code in a new paid job. Moonlighters in a different 3-digit SOC code are 44 percent 
more likely to transition to a different 3-digit SOC code in self-employment in the next year and 
some 36 percent more likely to transition to a different 3-digit SOC code in a new paid job. Hence, 
the positive associations are robust to the inspection of differences in all three levels of the SOC 
codes, both at the moonlighting occupational choice and the new job/new position occupational 
choice.  
6.5 Alternative interpretations 
The findings of the last sections suggest that there are human capital spill-over effects between 
primary and secondary employment. Individuals may use multiple job-holding as a conduit for 
obtaining new skills and expertise and as a stepping stone to a new career.xxi Individuals doing a 
different occupation in their secondary job are more likely to change jobs and perform a different 
occupation in the next year.   
However, there could be an alternative interpretation of the previous results. In regions with 
limited demand for a certain occupation, an individual could be performing a different occupation in 
his/her secondary job for primarily financial reasons, and then for the same reasons also be more 
likely to move to a different occupation in his primary job in the next yearxxii. Moreover, financially 
vulnerable individuals could be moonlighting in self-employment jobs in order to escape poverty, 
and then move to subsistence self-employment jobs in the next year out of necessity. Such primarily 
financial motives would need to be ruled out as the primary candidate explanation of the results. All 
our previous specifications incorporate controls for regional unemployment, equivalized household 
income, occupation, industry and region of residence. Hence, to a great extend such concerns are 
mitigated. However, in this section we examine the determinants of variables approximating upward 
mobility in the next job.  
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In Table 7 we present estimates of job outcomes in the year following the survey, using again the 
methodology described in Section 5.2. The occupational choice model in equation (13) is estimated 
separately for those who (a) become self-employed, (b) get a new job with a new employer or (c) a 
new position with the same employer at period t+1, with the job mobility models of columns I-IV in 
Table 5 serving as first stage regressions that correct for the potential incidental truncation bias. The 
control group comprises of individuals staying in the same job. Linear regression models are 
estimated in the second stage, incorporating the inverse Mills ratios obtained in the first stage. Three 
specific new job outcomes are examined, namely (a) the percentage monthly wage difference 
between the year t+1 and the year t; (b) upward wage mobility, defined as a binary variable taking the 
value 1 for a percentage monthly wage increase greater than 15% compared to the last year; (c) 
upward skill group mobility between the year t+1 and the year t. This is a binary variable that takes 
the value 1 for a transition to a skilled non-manual occupational group in year t+1, by individuals 
working in skilled occupational categories in the year t (either manual or non-manual). Moreover, it 
also takes the value 1 if an individual transitions from any of the unskilled categories in year t to 
skilled occupations in the year t+1. The four occupational skill categories are defined at the 1-digit 
levelxxiii.  
In Panel A of Table 7, it is shown that moonlighting exerts a significant impact on the probability 
of upward wage mobility for individuals switching into a new job in the year t+1. Specifically, 
moonlighters who switch into a new job in the next year earn 4 percentage points more than non-
moonlighters. Taking into account that the average predicted percentage wage change is 9.4 percent, 
this is an effect of a large magnitude. Moreover, moonlighters are 6.5 percentage points more likely 
to experience a monthly wage increase greater than 15 percent of their wage in year t. This amounts 
to an effect in the magnitude of 17 percent. The results are robust when hourly wages are used 
instead of monthly wages (available upon request).  
The results presented in Panel B of Table 7 show that individuals moonlighting in different 
occupations in year t are more likely to transition to a new job at skilled occupational category in the 
year t+1 compared to individuals moonlighting in the same occupation as in their primary job. 
Occupational diversification in moonlighting at the 1-digit SOC level exerts a 12.4 percentage point 
effect (around 85 percent given the linear prediction of the model) at the probability of transitioning 
to a skilled occupation for individuals moving into a new job in the year t+1 (column B6). The effect 
is also significant for individuals moving into self-employment (column B3). The effects are 
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somewhat smaller in magnitude for diversification at the 2-digit and the 3-digit SOC level, although 
significant and of a large magnitude (columns B15 and B24).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Hence, moonlighting is associated with a wage increase for individuals moving into a new job, 
and moonlighting into different occupations is positively related to the probability of moving into a 
skilled occupational category in the next year. These results are considered to be in accordance with 
the human capital spillover interpretation of the previous results.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This study has investigated the inter-related dynamics of multiple job-holding, human capital and 
occupational choices between primary and secondary jobs, using a panel sample of UK employees 
from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 1991-2005.  The sequential profile of 
the working lives of employees has been examined, investigating the motives of multiple job-
holding, its impact on the probability of job mobility and the associated spillover effects on 
occupational transition between alternative main jobs.   
The analysis reveals that multiple job-holding, in addition to being a temporary response to 
hours-constraints, increased labour market uncertainty, and financial shocks, contains a permanent 
labour market element as it appears to be persistent over time.  The examination of the occupational 
choice in the second job also provides some interesting insights.  Individuals facing increased 
commitments or financial constraints are found to be more likely to do the same occupation in both 
their primary and secondary job, exploiting the higher earnings opportunities that their accumulated 
occupational experience may entail.  This result is further strengthened by the fact that individuals 
with lengthier occupational experience in their primary job are less likely to choose a different 
occupation in their second job.  Nevertheless, individuals who enjoy a relative sense of financial 
security are found to be more likely to explore different occupational paths in their secondary 
employment to satisfy their intrinsic preferences. 
Multiple job-holding is estimated to be an important determinant of job mobility decisions.  
Moonlighting is found to increase the probability of becoming self-employed or getting a new job, 
while it decreases the probability of becoming unemployed or inactive, compared to staying at the 
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same job. Moreover, individuals doing different occupations in their secondary employment are 
more likely to change jobs in the following year.  The estimates also suggest that there are human 
capital spill-over effects between primary and secondary employment.  The occupational choices 
that individuals make as multiple job-holders play an important role in the occupational paths that 
they follow afterwards. In particular, individuals who carry out the same occupation in the primary 
and secondary job at period t are less likely to perform a different occupation in the new primary job 
at period t+1. The opposite is true for those who do different occupations in their primary and 
secondary jobs at the previous period t. The evidence provided in this study suggests that individuals 
may be using multiple job-holding as a conduit for obtaining new skills and expertise and as a 
stepping stone to new careers, particularly ones that involve self-employment. This empirical finding 
is in support of the proposition derived in theoretical discussion of Section 3. We acknowledge 
however the possibility that second job-holding may be endogenous in the occupational mobility 
decision, and that the literature can benefit from complementary empirical evidence on the direction 
of causality stemming from alternative identification strategies.  
From a policy point of view, the findings suggest that, depending on the motives behind 
moonlighting, different approaches with distinct priorities and objectives may be pursued. The 
evidence indicates that for more vulnerable groups of people, particularly those on low incomes and 
with low education, moonlighting may be more of a necessity rather than a choice. Whereas, more 
financially stable individuals can “afford” to use multiple job-holding as an avenue to develop and 
enrich their skills, explore alternative career paths and pursue possible entrepreneurial activities 
through self-employment. The policy priorities in the first case should probably focus more on 
strengthening job security and on safeguarding a stable income stream to the vulnerable segments of 
society. Furthermore, issues related to work-life balance and overall well-being may warrant 
particular attention, since individuals who face financial hardships may be induced to compromise 
their physical and mental health when working in multiple jobs. For the second group of people, 
moonlighting may be a useful avenue through which labour market flexibility, innovation and 
entrepreneurship can be fostered. There is an increasing policy interest for nurturing the 
employability of individuals within a highly mobile and flexible labour market (Employment in 
Europe, 2004). Based on the results of this study, moonlighting is found to be a potential 
mechanism that can facilitate this process. Policy priorities could therefore focus on identifying ways 
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through which multiple job-holding can lead to the more efficient acquisition of skills, and to 
promote future potential entrepreneurial initiatives.   
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Figure 1: The Incidence of Male Dual Job-Holding and Unemployment Rates 
 
 
 
Notes: Moonlighting data are from the BHPS. Unemployment and Local Claimants’ rate data are from National Statistics 
Online.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Primary and Secondary Jobs 
 
Panel A: Sample of paid employees in primary job 
 Primary Job Secondary Job 
# Obs. [No. of individuals] 37,209 [5,583] 2,600 [1,080] 
Dual Job Holder 7.0% (0.26) -  
Weekly Hours  39.47 (7.42) 6.08 (5.44) 
 [39.00] [4.67] 
Monthly Hours   169.11 (31.78) 26.04 (23.32) 
 [167.12] [20.00] 
Real Monthly Earnings 1,340.41 (878.21) 230.81 (368.40) 
 [1,168.60] [136.05] 
Real Hourly Earnings 7.49 (5.25) 14.55 (21.96) 
 [6.22] [6.94] 
      Occupation (1-digit SOC)     
Managers & administrators 17.9% (0.38) 6.1% (0.24) 
Professional occupations 10.4% (0.30) 10.3% (0.30) 
Assoc. professional & technical occ. 10.6% (0.31) 20.7% (0.40) 
Clerical & secretarial occupations 9.7% (0.30) 3.7% (0.19) 
Craft & related occupations 18.7% (0.39) 17.8% (0.38) 
Personal & protective service occ. 6.5% (0.25) 20.4% (0.40) 
Sales occupations 4.6% (0.21) 3.2% (0.18) 
Plant & machine operatives 14.8% (0.35) 5.6% (0.23) 
Other occupations 6.9% (0.25) 12.3% (0.33) 
Other 2nd job characteristics     
Different SOC between 2nd and primary job (1-digit) -  68.0% (0.47) 
Different SOC between 2nd and primary job (2-digit) -  79.0% (0.41) 
Different SOC between 2nd and primary job (3-digit) -  84.0% (0.37) 
Serial Moonlighter -  49.1% (0.50) 
Temporary Moonlighter -  50.9% (0.50) 
Serial Moonlighter -  49.5% (0.50) 
Paid Employee -  50.5% (0.50) 
 
Panel B: Sample of dual job holders 
Occupational choice in the second job 
1-digit SOC 2-digit SOC 1-digit SOC 
Different Same Different Same Different Same 
# Obs. [No. of individuals] 1,764 832 2,043 543 2,173 413 
Primary job characteristics:        
Weekly Hours  38.26 38.64 38.41 38.31 38.29 38.93 
Monthly Hours   163.94 165.59 164.57 164.16 164.05 166.82 
Real Monthly Earnings 1,149.31 1,301.14*** 1,171.23 1,291.92*** 1,176.08 1,304.10*** 
Real Hourly Earnings 6.69 7.52*** 6.76 7.62*** 6.85 7.43*** 
Secondary job characteristics:       
Weekly Hours  6.39*** 5.43 6.34*** 5.08 6.25*** 5.13 
Monthly Hours   27.38*** 23.25 27.16*** 21.77 26.80*** 22.00 
Real Monthly Earnings 214.82 265.77*** 221.88 266.12*** 222.35 277.54*** 
Real Hourly Earnings 13.09 17.64*** 13.74 17.39*** 13.78 18.32*** 
Serial Moonlighter 49.15% 49.28% 49.29% 49.36% 49.42% 48.67% 
Self-Employed 45.69% 57.69%*** 47.09% 59.48%*** 47.31% 62.23%*** 
 
Notes: The table presents means and standard deviations in parentheses. Medians are presented in brackets for selected 
variables.   
  
33 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics and Mean Differences 
 
Sample Employed Dual Job Holders 
 (A) (B) (C) 
Variable Pooled Dual-Job  Single-Job Different (1-d) Same (1-d) 
#Obs. 37,209 2,600   34,561   1,764   832   
Real gross usual monthly earnings 1,340 1,198  1,351 *** 1,149  1,301 *** 
Hourly wage 7.49 6.95  7.54 *** 6.69  7.52 *** 
Low-paid group 8.2% 13.2% *** 7.9%  14.1% * 11.4%   
Real equivalized household income 20,895 19,417  21,009 *** 18,954  20,416 *** 
Financially vulnerable group  18.0% 23.4% *** 17.6%  22.4%  25.4% * 
Cohabiting/Married and partner employed  58.0% 55.7%  58.2% ** 55.6%  56.3%   
Cohabiting/Married and partner not employed 15.8% 14.7%  15.9%  12.4%  19.6% *** 
Single/Divorced 26.2% 29.6% *** 25.9%  32.0% *** 24.2%   
Age 37.50 35.92  37.62 *** 35.82  36.17   
Labour Market Experience (Age-School Leaving Age) 20.77 18.87  20.91 *** 18.89  18.88   
Occupational Experience 11.19 10.66  11.23 *** 10.35  11.32 *** 
Job Tenure 5.71 5.51  5.72 * 5.34  5.86 ** 
High education 17.1% 19.1% *** 16.9%  17.1%  23.4% *** 
Middle education 58.8% 60.8% ** 58.7%  64.6% *** 52.8%   
Low education 23.3% 19.6%  23.6% *** 18.0%  23.1% *** 
Usual Weekly Hours of Work 39.47 38.38  39.55 *** 38.26  38.64   
Full-time job 96.6% 93.0%  96.9% *** 93.4%  92.2%   
Wants to work more hours in primary occupation 6.8% 10.5% *** 6.5%  11.3% * 8.8%   
Wants to work the same hours in primary occupation 55.5% 55.6%  55.5%  55.6%  56.0%   
Wants to work less  hours in primary occupation 35.7% 31.9%  36.0% *** 31.5%  32.8%   
Paid Overtime hours of work 3.05 2.43  3.10 *** 2.36  2.61   
Job Satisfaction 5.21 5.18  5.21  5.14  5.26 ** 
SOC: Managers & administrators 17.9% 14.1%  18.2% *** 17.2% *** 7.5%   
SOC: Professional occupations 10.4% 14.1% *** 10.1%  11.4%  19.7% *** 
SOC: Assoc. professional & technical occ. 10.6% 11.4%  10.6%  9.0%  16.5% *** 
SOC: Clerical & secretarial occupations 9.7% 8.4%  9.8% ** 10.9% *** 3.3%   
SOC: Craft & related occupations 18.7% 18.1%  18.7%  13.2%  28.6% *** 
SOC: Personal & protective service occ. 6.5% 9.2% *** 6.3%  8.1%  11.5% *** 
SOC: Sales occupations 4.6% 5.1%  4.6%  6.6% *** 1.8%   
SOC: Plant & machine operatives 14.8% 12.4%  14.9% *** 15.8% *** 5.3%   
SOC: Other occupations 6.9% 7.2%  6.9%  7.9% * 5.9%   
Job Transitions in the next year:              
Self-Employed  2.0% 3.8% *** 1.9%  3.8%  4.0%   
Paid Employee  95.5% 94.2%  95.6% *** 94.3%  94.0%   
Employed in a New Job with a New Employer  11.2% 13.7% *** 11.0%  13.6%  14.0%   
Employed in a New Position with Same Employer  13.1% 12.6%  13.2%  12.6%  12.1%   
Employed in Same  Position with Same Employer  71.1% 67.9%  71.4% *** 68.0%  67.9%   
Unemployed  2.1% 1.9%  2.2%  1.8%  2.0%   
Inactive 0.4% 0.1%  0.4% * 0.2%  0.0%   
Mobility into new employment or new position (#Obs.) 8,324 682  7,636  461  221  
Different SOC in next job (1-digit) 43.6% 46.5%  43.4%  53.8% *** 31.2%   
Different SOC in next job (2-digit) 56.3% 59.1%  56.1%  66.4% *** 43.9%   
Different SOC in next job (3-digit) 60.9% 64.0% * 60.6%  70.3% *** 50.7%   
% monthly wage difference 9.16% 14.3% *** 8.8%  13.9%  15.1%  
Upward wage mobility 34.8% 44.0% *** 34.1%  44.0%  44.0%  
Upwards skill group mobility 15.2% 17.5% * 15.0%  21.9% *** 8.1%  
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 from a t-test between mean differences. 
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Table 3: The Profile of the Dual Job-Holder 
Wooldridge Estimator: Dynamic Random Effects Probit with Mundlak terms 
 
Dependent Variable: Dual-Job Holder 
Level effects Average effects Permanent effects 
M.Eff.  [S.E.] M.Eff.  [S.E.] M.Eff.  [S.E.] 
Moonlighting(t-1)    0.106***  [0.015]  -    -  
Moonlighting(Year1)    0.078***  [0.010]  -   -  
Log(Equivalized household income in the last year)   -0.007***  [0.002]    0.007*** [0.003] -0.001  [0.002] 
Local unemployment rate 0.001*  [0.001] -0.001*  [0.001] 0.001  [0.001] 
Job satisfaction   -0.001**  [0.000]    0.001*   [0.001] 0.001  [0.001] 
Log(Experience) -0.002  [0.003] 0.001  [0.003] -0.001  [0.001] 
Log(Occupational experience) 0.001  [0.001]   -0.003**  [0.002]   -0.003**  [0.001] 
Log(Tenure)    0.002***  [0.001]   -0.003*** [0.001] -0.001  [0.001] 
Wants to work more hours in primary job 0.003  [0.002]    0.011**  [0.004]    0.013***  [0.004] 
Wants to work the same hours in primary occupation {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
Wants to work less hours in primary job   -0.002**  [0.001] 0.002  [0.002] -0.001  [0.002] 
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) 0.001  [0.003] -0.004  [0.004] -0.004  [0.004] 
Log(Paid overtime hours)   -0.001***  [0.000]    0.001**  [0.001] -0.001  [0.000] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed -0.001  [0.002] -0.002  [0.003] -0.003  [0.002] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed -0.002  [0.002]   -0.006*   [0.004]   -0.009***  [0.003] 
Single/Divorced {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
Log(No. of children) -0.001  [0.001]    0.003*** [0.001]    0.002***  [0.001] 
Private sector   -0.006*   [0.003] 0.003  [0.004] -0.002  [0.003] 
Permanent job 0.001  [0.002]   -0.012**  [0.005]   -0.012***  [0.004] 
Promotion prospects in primary job -0.001  [0.001]   -0.005**  [0.002]   -0.006***  [0.002] 
Annual increments   -0.002*   [0.001] -0.002  [0.002]   -0.004**  [0.002] 
High education {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
Middle education 0.004  [0.005] -0.003  [0.006] 0.001  [0.002] 
Low education -0.005  [0.006] 0.006  [0.009] 0.001  [0.003] 
Occupation (1-digit SOC codes):     
Managers and administrators {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
Professional occupations 0.002  [0.003] 0.006  [0.004]    0.007**   [0.003] 
Associate professional & technical occupations 0.002  [0.003] 0.006  [0.004]    0.008***  [0.003] 
Clerical & secretarial occupations 0.002  [0.003] -0.002  [0.004] 0.001  [0.004] 
Craft & related occupations 0.002  [0.003] 0.003  [0.004]    0.006*   [0.003] 
Personal & protective service occupations    0.014*   [0.007] -0.002  [0.005]    0.007*   [0.004] 
Sales occupations 0.006  [0.005] 0.002  [0.005]    0.007*   [0.004] 
Plant & machine operatives 0.004  [0.003] 0.002  [0.004]    0.006*   [0.003] 
Other occupations 0.005  [0.004] -0.004  [0.005] 0.001  [0.004] 
Industry (SIC codes):        
Agriculture, hunting and forestry or fishing 0.001  [0.005] 0.008  [0.007] 0.008  [0.005] 
Mining and quarrying 0.002  [0.009] -0.009  [0.011] -0.007  [0.009] 
Manufacturing 0.002  [0.003]   -0.010**  [0.004]   -0.008**  [0.003] 
Electricity, gas and water supply   -0.005*   [0.003] -0.015  [0.011]   -0.023**  [0.010] 
Construction {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
Wholesale and retail trade 0.004  [0.004] -0.003  [0.005] 0.001  [0.003] 
Hotels and restaurants 0.003  [0.006] -0.005  [0.007] -0.002  [0.005] 
Transport, storage and communication -0.004  [0.003] 0.002  [0.006] -0.003  [0.004] 
Financial intermediation 0.007  [0.008] -0.006  [0.006] 0.001  [0.004] 
Real estate, renting and business 0.001  [0.003] -0.001  [0.005] -0.001  [0.004] 
Public administration and defence -0.002  [0.003] 0.005  [0.006] 0.003  [0.004] 
Education   -0.004*   [0.003]    0.015**  [0.007]    0.009*   [0.005] 
Health and social work 0.001  [0.005] 0.005  [0.007] 0.006  [0.005] 
Other community, social & personal service activities 0.001  [0.005] 0.002  [0.007] 0.003  [0.005] 
Private households with employees 0.052  [0.128] 0.050  [0.051]    0.069*   [0.041] 
Table 3 continued in next page 
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Table 3 continued from last page 
 Level effects Average effects Permanent effects 
 M.Eff.  [S.E.] M.Eff.  [S.E.] M.Eff.  [S.E.] 
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies   -0.006**  [0.003] 0.006  [0.021] -0.004  [0.020] 
Region:     
Greater London {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
Remainder of South East   -0.007**  [0.003]    0.017**  [0.006]    0.007**   [0.003] 
East Anglia                                       0.010  [0.017] -0.001  [0.009] 0.006  [0.004] 
South West                                          -0.006*   [0.004]    0.019**  [0.009]    0.009***  [0.003] 
West Midlands                                     0.004  [0.012] 0.003  [0.010]    0.006**   [0.003] 
East Midlands                                     -0.003  [0.006] 0.004  [0.009] -0.001  [0.003] 
Yorkshire & Humberside -0.007  [0.005] 0.010  [0.013] -0.001  [0.003] 
North West                                        -0.006  [0.005] 0.006  [0.011] -0.003  [0.003] 
North                                               -0.008***  [0.003]    0.021*   [0.012] 0.005  [0.003] 
Wales                                             -0.006  [0.006] 0.012  [0.011] 0.004  [0.003] 
Scotland                                            -0.011***  [0.004]    0.027*   [0.015]    0.006**   [0.003] 
Waves:      
Wave 3 {Ref.}   
Wave 4    0.006*   [0.004] - - 
Wave 5 0.003  [0.006] - - 
Wave 6 0.004  [0.009] - - 
Wave 7 0.008  [0.017] - - 
Wave 8 0.001  [0.014] - - 
Wave 9 0.003  [0.018] - - 
Wave 10 0.001  [0.016] - - 
Wave 11 -0.001  [0.016] - - 
Wave 12 0.001  [0.017] - - 
Wave 13 0.002  [0.020] - - 
Wave 14 0.004  [0.024] - - 
Wave 15 -0.002  [0.014] - - 
                                             
Predicted Probability 3.44%                      
#Obs. [no. of individuals]                                       28,026 [5,169]             
Log-likelihood                                                -4,121.5                                 
Wald χ2                                                     1863.0***                     
LR χ2 (ρ=0)  330.2***      
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The specification also includes a constant term. The coefficients and standard 
errors of the permanent effects are derived from tests of the linear constraint that the summation of the level and the 
mean effect of each variable are equal to zero, e.g. 𝛽(Local Unemployment Rate)+𝛿(Local Unemployment Rate]=0. The marginal effects 
presented calculate the probability of a positive outcome, assuming that the random effect for that observation's panel 
is equal to zero.  
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Table 4: Dual Job Holding and Occupational Choice 
Two-stage Pooled OLS with bootstrapped standard errors 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Different 2nd job 
[1-digit] [2-digit] [3-digit] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Difference in hourly wage (primary occ. vs. next best)   -0.084***   -0.069**  -0.025 
  [0.030]     [0.027]     [0.025]    
Local unemployment rate 0.002 0.002 0.005 
  [0.016]     [0.014]     [0.013]    
Log (Equiv. annual household income in the last year) -0.038 -0.032   -0.048**  
  [0.026]     [0.022]     [0.019]    
Job satisfaction -0.004 0.004 0.002 
  [0.007]     [0.006]     [0.006]    
Log(Labour market experience) 0.014 0.016    0.028**  
  [0.015]     [0.013]     [0.012]    
Log(Occupational experience)   -0.034***   -0.043***   -0.026**  
  [0.013]     [0.011]     [0.010]    
Log(Tenure) 0.011    0.023*** 0.005 
  [0.011]     [0.009]     [0.008]    
Wants to work more hours in primary job 0.026 0.001 -0.007 
  [0.032]     [0.028]     [0.026]    
Wants to work the same hours in primary occupation {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
    Wants to work less hours in primary job -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 
  [0.020]     [0.018]     [0.017]    
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) -0.016 0.031 0.02 
  [0.036]     [0.034]     [0.032]    
Log(Paid overtime hours) -0.008   -0.008*     -0.010**  
  [0.005]     [0.005]     [0.004]    
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed   -0.056**  -0.035   -0.043**  
  [0.024]     [0.022]     [0.020]    
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed   -0.169***   -0.139***   -0.099*** 
  [0.034]     [0.033]     [0.031]    
Single/Divorced {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
    
Log(No. of children) -0.007 -0.005 -0.01 
  [0.008]     [0.007]     [0.007]    
Private Sector -0.047 -0.015 0.005 
  [0.032]     [0.028]     [0.026]    
Permanent job 0.044 -0.003 -0.006 
  [0.043]     [0.037]     [0.035]    
Promotion prospects in primary job    0.040**  0.028 0.019 
  [0.020]     [0.017]     [0.016]    
Annual increments -0.015 -0.006 0.009 
  [0.020]     [0.017]     [0.016]    
High education  {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
    Middle education 0.032 0.001 -0.039 
  [0.030]     [0.027]     [0.024]    
Low education   -0.063*   -0.016 -0.034 
  [0.038]     [0.034]     [0.030]    
Mills Ratio    0.064*      0.057*   0.046 
  [0.036]     [0.033]     [0.031]    
 Occupation (1-digit SOC codes):     
Managers and administrators {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
    
Table 4 continued in next page 
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Table 4 continued from last page 
 Different 2nd job 
 [1-digit] [2-digit] [3-digit] 
Professional occupations   -0.304***   -0.310***   -0.231*** 
  [0.041]     [0.035]     [0.033]    
Associate professional & technical occupations   -0.319***   -0.232***   -0.221*** 
  [0.037]     [0.031]     [0.030]    
Clerical & secretarial occupations -0.048 -0.032 -0.011 
  [0.036]     [0.026]     [0.024]    
Craft & related occupations   -0.320***   -0.287***   -0.234*** 
  [0.037]     [0.031]     [0.027]    
Personal & protective service occupations   -0.290***   -0.189***   -0.112*** 
  [0.044]     [0.035]     [0.031]    
Sales occupations -0.013   -0.062*   -0.051 
  [0.041]     [0.036]     [0.033]    
Plant & machine operatives 0.007   -0.045*   -0.027 
  [0.034]     [0.027]     [0.025]    
Other occupations -0.059 -0.028 -0.007 
  [0.046]     [0.037]     [0.033]    
 Region:     
Greater London {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
    Remainder of South East -0.020 -0.025 -0.019 
  [0.040]     [0.038]     [0.035]    
East Anglia                                          0.089*   0.065 0.048 
  [0.052]     [0.046]     [0.042]    
South West                                        -0.02 -0.004 0.003 
  [0.046]     [0.043]     [0.038]    
West Midlands                                     -0.02 -0.006 0.011 
  [0.047]     [0.044]     [0.040]    
East Midlands                                     -0.056 0.04 0.009 
  [0.053]     [0.045]     [0.041]    
Yorkshire & Humberside    0.010 0.026 0.05 
  [0.049]     [0.046]     [0.040]    
North West                                        -0.001 -0.013 0.011 
  [0.054]     [0.046]     [0.042]    
North                                             -0.003 -0.054 -0.018 
  [0.049]     [0.047]     [0.041]    
Wales                                             0.057 0.032 0.009 
  [0.044]     [0.040]     [0.037]    
Scotland                                          -0.009 -0.011 0.026 
  [0.045]     [0.042]     [0.036]    
    
Linear prediction 68.30% 79.32% 84.27% 
No. of Observations                                       2,413 2,403 2,403 
No. of Individuals                                        1,016 1,011 1,011 
No. of Censored Observations (sum)                                      34,112 34,112 34,112 
R2                                                        0.174 0.167 0.141 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The specification also includes industry and wave (year) fixed effects, 
along with a constant term. Coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors based on 1,000 replications are 
presented. The estimates presented are from 2nd stage regressions. The 1st stage is a selection equation for the 
decision to be a dual job-holder as proposed by Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2005). In total, 
there are 34,112 censored observations in the 1st stage (calculated as a summation of the number of censored 
observations in the 15 yearly regressions). 
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Table 5: Job Mobility and Dual Job Holding 
Random effects probit models 
 
Dep. var.:  
Mobility[t+1] into: 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Self- 
employment 
New 
Employment 
New  
Position 
Unemployment 
/Inactivity 
Panel A: Moonlighting [main explanatory variable] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Moonlighter    0.010***    0.024*** 0.001   -0.004*** 
                                                           [0.003]     [0.008]     [0.009]     [0.002]    
Panel B: Occupational choice in moonlighting [main explanatory variables] 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Different [1-digit] SOC 0.001 0.014* -0.020 0.001 
                                                           [0.002]     [0.008]     [0.016]     [0.005]    
Same [1-digit] SOC {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
     Non-moonlighter   -0.009**    -0.031**  -0.016 0.004 
  [0.004]     [0.014]     [0.016]     [0.003]    
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Different [2-digit] SOC 0.001 0.018**   -0.038**  0.002 
                                                           [0.002]     [0.009]     [0.016]     [0.007]    
Same [2-digit] SOC {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
     Non-moonlighter   -0.009*     -0.038**    -0.038*   0.004 
  [0.005]     [0.018]     [0.021]     [0.004]    
 (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Different [3-digit] SOC 0.001 0.019**   -0.044*** 0.005 
                                                           [0.002]     [0.009]     [0.016]     [0.010]    
Same [3-digit] SOC {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
     Non-moonlighter   -0.010*     -0.036*     -0.047*   0.006 
  [0.006]     [0.020]     [0.024]     [0.004]    
Panel C: Type of moonlighting      
 (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Serial moonlighter 0.001   -0.030*** -0.009 0.002 
                                                           [0.002]     [0.009]     [0.016]     [0.005]    
Temporary moonlighter {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
     Non-moonlighter   -0.010***   -0.042*** -0.005    0.004*   
  [0.004]     [0.011]     [0.012]     [0.002]    
     
Model statistics [all models in each column] (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Pred. probability 0.0097 0.1236 0.1434 0.0232 
# Observations 22,268 25,136 25,758 22,501 
# Individuals 4,815 5,061 5,047 4,869 
 
Notes: p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All cells present marginal effects and standard errors from random effects probit 
models. The specifications are identical to Table 3, with the addition of the logarithm of minutes of commuting to work 
in the 2nd stage regressions. The specification of the 1st stage regressions incorporates the difference in hourly wage 
(primary occ. vs. next best) in that of Table 3.   
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Table 6: Job Mobility, Occupational Choice, and Dual Job Holding 
Two-stage Pooled OLS with bootstrapped standard errors 
 
Dep. var.: 
Different Occupation[t+1] 
(I) (II) (III) 
Self-employment New employment New position 
[1-digit] [2-digit] [3-digit] [1-digit] [2-digit] [3-digit] [1-digit] [2-digit] [3-digit] 
Panel A: Moonlighting          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Moonlighter 0.068    0.121*   0.103 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.010 0.015 
                                                          [0.068]     [0.067]     [0.065]     [0.030]     [0.028]     [0.028]     [0.033]     [0.032]     [0.032]    
Panel B: Occupational choice in moonlighting       
 (10)   (11)   (12)   
Different [1-digit] SOC    0.578*** - -    0.165*** - - 0.091 - - 
                                                           [0.105]    
  
 [0.058]    
  
 [0.063]    
  Same [1-digit] SOC {Ref.} - - {Ref.} - - {Ref.} - - 
          Non-moonlighter    0.318*** - -    0.118**  - - 0.061 - - 
  [0.083]    
  
 [0.048]    
  
 [0.053]    
    (13)  (14)  (15) 
Different [2-digit] SOC -    0.280*   - -    0.219*** - -    0.169**  - 
                                                          
 
 [0.144]    
  
 [0.066]    
  
 [0.067]    
 Same [2-digit] SOC - {Ref.} - - {Ref.} - - {Ref.} - 
          Non-moonlighter - 0.105 - -    0.172*** - -    0.120**  - 
 
 
 [0.134]    
  
 [0.059]    
  
 [0.059]    
   (16)  (17)  (18) 
Different [3-digit] SOC - -    0.315*   - -    0.301*** - -    0.140*   
                                                          
  
 [0.163]    
  
 [0.072]    
  
 [0.076]    
Same [3-digit] SOC - - {Ref.} - - {Ref.} - - {Ref.} 
          Non-moonlighter - - 0.159 - -    0.251*** - - 0.099 
 
  
 [0.155]    
  
 [0.067]    
  
 [0.071]    
Panel C: Moonlighting type         
 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Serial moonlighter    0.215*   0.081 0.133 0.036 0.040 0.060 0.054 0.047 0.020 
                                                           [0.116]     [0.123]     [0.119]     [0.060]     [0.061]     [0.060]     [0.059]     [0.060]     [0.060]    
Temporary moonlighter {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
          Non-moonlighter 0.019 -0.089 -0.049 0.018 0.014 0.021 0.023 0.012 -0.005 
  [0.085]     [0.086]     [0.085]     [0.036]     [0.034]     [0.034]     [0.043]     [0.044]     [0.044]    
Model statistics [all models in each column]      
Linear prediction 0.4536 0.5732 0.6144 0.4787 0.6099 0.6537 0.4053 0.5301 0.5772 
No. of observations 485 485 485 3,367 3,367 3,367 3,989 3,989 3,989 
No. of uncensored observations 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors from two-stage pooled OLS models. The 1st 
stage models are three sets of selection equations for the decision to change job in the next year (a) into self-employment, (b) new 
employment, and (c) new position with the same employer (the comparison group comprises of individuals staying in the same job in 
the next year). The number of uncensored observations in the first stage is calculated as the summation of the number of censored 
observations in the three sets of 14 yearly regressions. All remaining information is provided in Table A2 in the Appendix.  
Table 7: Job Mobility, Outcomes, and Dual Job Holding 
Two-stage Pooled OLS with bootstrapped standard errors 
 
                                                          Self-employment New job New position 
Dep. var.: % month. 
wage 
difference 
Upward 
wage 
mobility  
Upward 
skill 
mobility 
% month. 
wage 
difference 
Upward 
wage 
mobility  
Upward 
skill 
mobility 
% month. 
wage 
difference 
Upward 
wage 
mobility  
Upward 
skill 
mobility 
Panel A: Moonlighting 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8) (A9) 
Moonlighter 0.121 0.090 0.012 0.040**  0.065**  0.027 0.019 0.048 -0.006 
  [0.118]     [0.178]     [0.046]     [0.016]     [0.030]     [0.022]     [0.014]     [0.032]     [0.021]    
          
Panel B: Occupational choice in moonlighting 
 (B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8) (B9) 
Different occupation [1-digit] 0.077 0.106  0.219*** 0.036 0.037 0.124*** 0.040 0.076 0.057 
                                                           [0.260]     [0.414]     [0.084]     [0.035]     [0.064]     [0.040]     [0.029]     [0.063]     [0.038]    
Non-moonlighter -0.066 -0.013    0.134**  -0.064**   -0.090*     0.057*   0.008 0.004 0.045 
                                                           [0.225]     [0.374]     [0.062]     [0.029]     [0.054]     [0.030]     [0.026]     [0.054]     [0.029]    
           (B10) (B11) (B12) (B13) (B14) (B15) (B16) (B17) (B18) 
Different occupation [2-digit] 0.217 0.245 0.085 0.061 0.115   0.075*   0.022 0.042 0.074**  
                                                           [0.360]     [0.625]     [0.094]     [0.040]     [0.073]     [0.045]     [0.033]     [0.069]     [0.036]    
Non-moonlighter 0.069 0.125 0.057 -0.088**  -0.156**  0.031 -0.003 -0.016 0.062**  
                                                           [0.355]     [0.617]     [0.083]     [0.036]     [0.065]     [0.039]     [0.030]     [0.062]     [0.027]    
           (B19) (B20) (B21) (B22) (B23) (B24) (B25) (B26) (B27) 
Different occupation [3-digit] 0.217 0.245 0.034 0.028 0.022   0.084*   0.028 0.065 0.051 
                                                           [0.360]     [0.625]     [0.100]     [0.045]     [0.082]     [0.049]     [0.036]     [0.075]     [0.039]    
Non-moonlighter 0.069 0.125 0.016 -0.064 -0.084 0.043 0.003 0.004 0.047 
                                                           [0.355]     [0.617]     [0.089]     [0.041]     [0.075]     [0.043]     [0.034]     [0.069]     [0.033]    
          
Panel C: Moonlighting type 
 (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) (C8) (C9) 
Serial moonlighter 0.326 0.374 -0.036    0.056*   0.058 0.068 -0.025 -0.030    0.078*   
                                                           [0.224]     [0.336]     [0.094]     [0.034]     [0.062]     [0.047]     [0.026]     [0.061]     [0.042]    
Non-moonlighter 0.046 0.103 -0.027 -0.022 -0.047 -0.005 -0.031 -0.062 0.042 
                                                           [0.150]     [0.241]     [0.058]     [0.020]     [0.036]     [0.026]     [0.020]     [0.042]     [0.026]    
          
Model statistics [all models in each column] 
Linear prediction 0.0192 0.3193 0.1814 0.094 0.3798 0.1449 0.0911 0.3178 0.1589 
No. of observations 166 166 485 3,265 3,265 3,367 3,886 3,886 3,989 
No. of uncensored observations 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 22,415 
           
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors from two-stage pooled OLS 
models. The 1st stage models are three sets of selection equations for the decision to change job in the next year (a) into 
self-employment, (b) new employment, and (c) new position with the same employer (the comparison group comprises 
of individuals staying in the same job in the next year). The number of uncensored observations in the first stage is 
calculated as the summation of the number of censored observations in the three sets of 14 yearly regressions. There are 
only 166 observations on the wage outcomes of the self-employed, as this information is obtained from a different 
question addressing only the self-employed in the BHPS. The variable entailed a large number of missing responses.  
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Appendix:  
A) Derivation of Proposition 
From equations (2) and (3) we can derive the necessary condition for  ∆1> ∆2: 
∆1> ∆2=> (1 − 𝛾
𝑖𝑗)𝐶𝑖 > (1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗)(𝑐𝑘 + 𝛾𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑖) ⟹ 
(1 − 𝛾𝑖𝑗)𝐶𝑖 − (1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗)𝛾𝑖𝑘𝐶𝑖 > (1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗)𝑐𝑘 ⟹ 
(1 − 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑘𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑘 − 𝛾𝑖𝑘)𝐶𝑖 > (1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗)𝑐𝑘 
Given that 0 < 𝛾𝑘𝑗 < 1,  𝑐𝑘 > 0, and 𝐶𝑖 > 0, it must be true that:  
1 − 𝛾𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑘𝑗𝛾𝑖𝑘 − 𝛾𝑖𝑘 > 0 ⟹ 
1 − 𝛾𝑖𝑗 > 𝛾𝑖𝑘 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗 ⟹ 
1 − 𝛾𝑖𝑗 > (1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑗)𝛾𝑖𝑘 ⟹ 
1−𝛾𝑖𝑗
1−𝛾𝑘𝑗
> 𝛾𝑖𝑘        (A1) 
This condition A1 will always hold when: 
𝛾𝑘𝑗 > 𝛾𝑖𝑗        (A2) 
because then  
1−𝛾𝑖𝑗
1−𝛾𝑘𝑗
> 1        (A3) 
Since 0 < 𝛾𝑖𝑘 < 1, it is always true that  
1−𝛾𝑖𝑗
1−𝛾𝑘𝑗
> 1 > 𝛾𝑖𝑘        (A4) 
which confirms that when 𝛾𝑘𝑗 > 𝛾𝑖𝑗, then ∆1> ∆2. 
 
B) Calculation of the difference in earnings (primary occupation vs. next best alternative) variable 
The best alternative occupation is detected based on an equation describing the occupational choice in the 
second job, using a multinomial probit model. Specifically, we let 𝑦2𝑗 denote the individual occupational 
choice of the second job, where 𝑦2𝑗  can take the unordered multinomial values j = {0,1,...,9} reflecting the 9 
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different 1-digit SOC groups. We then investigate how the set of conditioning variables 𝒗 = {𝑦1𝑗 , 𝒙}, where 
𝑦1𝑗 is the occupation of the individual in the primary job and 𝒙 captures other demographic and primary job-
specific variables, affect the probability of secondary-job selection, 𝑃(𝑦2𝑗 = 𝑗|𝒗), ceteris paribus. 
Based on the estimates of this model, the predicted probabilities of occupational choice in the second job, 
conditional on the occupation of the primary job, are shown in Table A1. The best alternative occupations 
can be easily obtained by looking across each row of Table A1 and selecting the cell with the highest predicted 
probability, excluding the elements of the diagonal. In doing so, it is evident that, for example, the best 
alternative occupation in the secondary job for those currently employed as Professional occupations in their 
primary job is an Associated Professional and Technical occupation.  
Utilizing the information of Table A1, the predicted wages from the best alternative occupation are hence 
calculated based on an hourly wage equation model: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜁𝑦1(𝑗)𝑖𝑡 + 𝑔𝑖𝑡  (A1) 
where, for instance, the predicted wage for Managers or Administrators (SOC code 2) is obtained as 
𝑙𝑛?̂?𝑖𝑡(2) = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ ?̂? + 𝜁𝑦1(3)𝑖𝑡, which is the wage the individuals would receive if they were employed in the 
next best category of Associated Professional and Technical occupation instead (SOC code 3).     
The difference in the earnings capacity between the current and the best alternative occupation is thus 
calculated as the difference between the wages received from the current occupation in the primary job and 
The predicted wages from the best alternative occupation in the second job. 
 
C) Presentation of full estimates of the models of Panel A in Tables 5 and 6 
 
Table A1: Occupational Transitions between 1st and 2nd job: Predicted Probabilities 
 
                                          2nd Job 
1st Job 
Group 1 
Manag. 
Group 2 
Profess. 
Group 3 
Associate 
Group 4 
Clerical 
Group 5 
Craft 
Group 6 
Personal 
Group 7 
Sales 
Group 8 
Plant 
Group 9 
Other  
Group 
1: 
Managers & administrators 17.2% 11.7% 21.0% 5.8% 8.3% 22.2% 4.2% 3.5% 6.2% 
Group 
2: 
Professional occupations 7.9% 36.2% 34.2% 1.7% 2.4% 9.7% 1.9% 2.9% 3.2% 
Group 
3: 
Assoc. professional & technical 
occ. 
7.5% 8.2% 45.1% 6.1% 11.2% 10.2% 4.0% 2.1% 5.7% 
Group 
4: 
Clerical & secretarial occupations 2.5% 2.2% 24.8% 12.5% 12.5% 20.5% 4.7% 6.0% 14.5% 
Group 
5: 
Craft & related occupations 3.8% 1.0% 8.3% 0.5% 48.4% 17.9% 0.7% 7.6% 11.8% 
Group 
6: 
Personal & protective service occ. 4.8% 3.0% 10.3% 1.7% 8.3% 40.2% 3.7% 9.3% 18.9% 
Group 
7: 
Sales occupations 12.6% 2.0% 22.2% 8.9% 8.5% 19.7% 11.9% 3.2% 11.1% 
Group 
8: 
Plant & machine operatives 2.4% 1.1% 19.2% 3.3% 15.0% 27.0% 3.2% 14.3% 14.6% 
Group 
9: 
Other occupations 7.9% 1.5% 11.6% 1.1% 22.4% 25.0% 2.9% 5.5% 22.1% 
 
Notes: The Table consists of predicted probabilities of 2nd job occupational choice, conditional on 1st job occupational choice, 
based on estimates of a Multinomial Probit model (available from the authors upon request).   
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Table A2: Job Mobility, Occupational Choice, and Dual Job Holding 
 
 
 
Sample 
(A) Random Effects Probit 
 
Employedt 
(B) Linear Probability Model 
with selectivity correction 
Job Switchers 
Dependent Variable: Mobilityt+1 into:  Different occupation in:   
 Self-
Emp. 
New  
Job 
New  
Position 
Not  
Employed 
Self-
Emp. 
New  
Job 
New 
Position 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (B1) (B2) (B3) 
Moonlighter    0.010***    0.024*** 0.001   -0.004*   0.068 -0.006 0.002 
  [0.003]     [0.008]     [0.009]     [0.002]     [0.068]     [0.030]     [0.033]    
Local unemployment rate 0.001 -0.026 -0.044 -0.008 0.123 -0.150 -0.075 
  [0.006]     [0.043]     [0.054]     [0.015]     [0.545]     [0.213]     [0.202]    
Log (Equiv. annual household income last year) 0.001   -0.017*** -0.008   -0.010*** 0.009   -0.046**  -0.008 
  [0.001]     [0.004]     [0.006]     [0.002]     [0.050]     [0.018]     [0.017]    
Job satisfaction   -0.001***   -0.027***  -0.014***   -0.004***  -0.052***  -0.024***   -0.015**  
  [0.000]     [0.001]     [0.002]     [0.001]     [0.016]     [0.005]     [0.006]    
Log(Labour market experience) -0.001   -0.037***  -0.039*** 0.001 0.027   -0.029**  0.001 
  [0.000]     [0.003]     [0.004]     [0.001]     [0.035]     [0.013]     [0.012]    
Log(Occupational experience) -0.001 -0.001 0.002    0.002*    -0.086***  -0.081***  -0.071*** 
  [0.000]     [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.001]     [0.031]     [0.013]     [0.012]    
Log(Tenure)   -0.002***   -0.061***  -0.044***   -0.005*** -0.007    0.022*     0.027*** 
  [0.001]     [0.003]     [0.003]     [0.001]     [0.024]     [0.013]     [0.010]    
Wants to work more hours  0.001    0.023***    0.024**  0.002 -0.145   -0.055*   0.038 
  [0.001]     [0.008]     [0.010]     [0.002]     [0.089]     [0.030]     [0.029]    
Wants to work the same hours  {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
        Wants to work less hours  -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.001 -0.031 0.01 -0.002 
  [0.001]     [0.004]     [0.005]     [0.001]     [0.046]     [0.019]     [0.017]    
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) 0.001    0.034*** -0.009 -0.004 -0.102   -0.119***   -0.070*   
  [0.001]     [0.009]     [0.011]     [0.003]     [0.081]     [0.039]     [0.037]    
Log(Paid overtime hours)   -0.000**  0.001    0.002*    -0.001*** -0.009 0.002   -0.010**  
  [0.000]     [0.001]     [0.001]     [0.000]     [0.013]     [0.004]     [0.004]    
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed 0.001 0.006 0.001   -0.012*** 0.044 0.007    0.056*** 
  [0.001]     [0.005]     [0.006]     [0.002]     [0.067]     [0.023]     [0.020]    
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed 0.001 0.004 0.009   -0.005*** 0.081 -0.019    0.069**  
  [0.001]     [0.007]     [0.009]     [0.002]     [0.085]     [0.031]     [0.028]    
Single/Divorced {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
        Log(No. of children) 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.018 0.001 -0.006 
  [0.000]     [0.002]     [0.002]     [0.000]     [0.018]     [0.007]     [0.006]    
High education  {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
        Middle education 0.001    0.015**  -0.010    0.006**  0.077    0.080*** 0.005 
  [0.001]     [0.006]     [0.007]     [0.002]     [0.068]     [0.027]     [0.022]    
Low education -0.001    0.037***   -0.022**    0.014*** 0.052    0.076**  0.031 
  [0.001]     [0.010]     [0.009]     [0.005]     [0.091]     [0.034]     [0.032]    
 Occupation (1-digit SOC codes):  
       Managers and administrators {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
 
       Professional  -0.001 0.003  -0.022*** -0.003 -0.012 -0.031    0.153*** 
  [0.001]     [0.008]     [0.008]     [0.002]     [0.102]     [0.040]     [0.031]    
Associate professional & technical    -0.001*   -0.008  -0.028***   -0.004*   -0.032 -0.013    0.252*** 
  [0.001]     [0.007]     [0.007]     [0.002]     [0.095]     [0.037]     [0.029]    
Clerical & secretarial    -0.003*** -0.007 -0.001   -0.005**    0.518*** 0.015    0.246*** 
  [0.001]     [0.007]     [0.009]     [0.002]     [0.085]     [0.036]     [0.029]    
Table A2 continued in next page 
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Table A2 continued from last page 
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (B1) (B2) (B3) 
Craft & related  -0.001 -0.009  -0.059*** 0.001   -0.139*    -0.120***    0.219*** 
  [0.001]     [0.007]     [0.007]     [0.003]     [0.073]     [0.033]     [0.031]    
Personal & protective service    -0.002**  -0.001   -0.024**  0.006    0.457*** -0.068    0.115*** 
  [0.001]     [0.010]     [0.010]     [0.004]     [0.120]     [0.044]     [0.037]    
Sales occupations -0.001    0.032*** -0.016 0.003    0.222**     0.077**     0.374*** 
  [0.001]     [0.011]     [0.010]     [0.004]     [0.099]     [0.039]     [0.037]    
Plant & machine operatives   -0.002*** -0.002  -0.050*** 0.001    0.185**    -0.074**    0.183*** 
  [0.001]     [0.007]     [0.007]     [0.002]     [0.091]     [0.034]     [0.033]    
Other occupations   -0.003***   -0.017**   -0.052*** 0.003    0.297**     0.139***    0.348*** 
  [0.001]     [0.008]     [0.009]     [0.003]     [0.121]     [0.041]     [0.044]    
 Region:  
       Greater London {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
        Remainder of South East -0.002 0.008 0.006   -0.006*** 0.014    0.076**  -0.003 
  [0.001]     [0.009]     [0.010]     [0.002]     [0.087]     [0.036]     [0.031]    
East Anglia                                         -0.003*** -0.014 0.006 -0.003 -0.011 0.068 -0.032 
  [0.001]     [0.011]     [0.015]     [0.003]     [0.148]     [0.054]     [0.048]    
South West                                          -0.002*** 0.004 -0.008 -0.002 0.104    0.079*      0.069*   
  [0.001]     [0.010]     [0.012]     [0.003]     [0.113]     [0.044]     [0.039]    
West Midlands                                       -0.002**  -0.008 -0.018   -0.004*   0.046 0.032 -0.01 
  [0.001]     [0.010]     [0.011]     [0.002]     [0.103]     [0.045]     [0.040]    
East Midlands                                       -0.002**  -0.012 -0.009 -0.001 0.056    0.104**  0.027 
  [0.001]     [0.009]     [0.012]     [0.003]     [0.121]     [0.044]     [0.037]    
Yorkshire & Humberside    -0.001 -0.01 -0.007 -0.002 0.034 0.064    0.071*   
  [0.001]     [0.009]     [0.012]     [0.003]     [0.098]     [0.044]     [0.039]    
North West                                        -0.001 -0.001   -0.019*     -0.004*   0.084 0.059 0.035 
  [0.001]     [0.010]     [0.011]     [0.002]     [0.100]     [0.042]     [0.036]    
North                                               -0.003***   -0.020**  0.014 -0.003 0.161 -0.021 0.007 
  [0.001]     [0.009]     [0.014]     [0.003]     [0.130]     [0.049]     [0.041]    
Wales                                               -0.003***   -0.022*** -0.002   -0.005**  -0.041    0.116*** -0.01 
  [0.001]     [0.008]     [0.011]     [0.002]     [0.097]     [0.042]     [0.036]    
Scotland                                          -0.001 -0.007   -0.021**  -0.004 0.124    0.072*   -0.007 
  [0.001]     [0.008]     [0.010]     [0.002]     [0.090]     [0.039]     [0.033]    
Other variables:  
       Log(Minutes commuting to work) 0.001    0.007***    0.007**     0.002*** - - - 
  [0.000]     [0.002]     [0.003]     [0.001]    
   Private Sector    0.005***    0.041*** 0.002    0.005*** - - - 
  [0.001]     [0.006]     [0.008]     [0.002]    
   Permanent job   -0.017***   -0.201***  -0.123***   -0.068*** - - - 
  [0.006]     [0.017]     [0.018]     [0.012]    
   Promotion prospects in primary job   -0.003***   -0.019***   0.053***   -0.005*** - - - 
  [0.001]     [0.004]     [0.005]     [0.001]    
   Annual increments   -0.004***   -0.016*** -0.006   -0.004*** - - - 
  [0.001]     [0.004]     [0.005]     [0.001]    
   Mills Ratio - - - - -0.021 -0.009   -0.068*** 
 
    
 [0.040]     [0.020]     [0.021]    
Predicted probability (linear prediction)   0.0097          0.1236            0.1434            0.0232            0.4536 0.4787 0.4053 
No. of Observations                                       22,268 25,136 25,758 22,501 485 3,367 3,989 
No. of Individuals                                        4,815 5,061 5,047 4,869  437           2,004 2,236            
Wald χ2                                                      317.7***  2,522.7***  1,455.2***    674.2***   1,366***    308.5***    398.6*** 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (A1)-(A4) present marginal effects and standard errors from a random effects probit model. (B1)-
(B3) show coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors from a linear probability model (based on 1,000 replications). The specifications 
also include dummy variables for industry {17}; wave {14}, and a constant term.  
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i The distinction is that the term “moonlighting” typically refers to illicitly holding more than one job. For the purposes 
of this paper the terms “dual job holding” and “moonlighting” will be used interchangeably.  
ii A recent European Commission report (2009) estimates that, since the start of the crisis, employment in the EU has 
shrunk by over 4 million, while by September 2009 the unemployment rate had increased to 9.2 per cent, a rise of 2.5 
percentage points compared with spring 2008. Total unemployment in the EU had increased to 22.1 million, a rise of 6.1 
million (or more than one-third). 
iii For ease of exposition we assume that both individuals carry the same occupational skills (i) from their primary job, so 
we focus only at the human capital loss from the secondary job when they move to a new primary job in occupation j. 
iv The derivation of the proposition is provided in Appendix A.  
v The BHPS data was made available through the ESRC Data Archive. The data was originally collected by the ESRC 
Research Centre on Micro-social Change, at the University of Essex. The original collectors of the data, the Data 
Archive and the affiliated institutions bear no responsibility for the analysis or interpretations presented here. 
vi There were some 611 such observations in the sample of dual job holders. A previous version of the paper including 
these observations rendered very similar results.  
vii The creation of the occupational-specific experience variable in the BHPS stems from the detailed work of Zangelidis 
(2008a). Occupational experience measures the total amount of time an individual has spent in his current occupation 
from the time he/she first entered the job market. The variable is constructed at the 1-digit level of occupation 
classification. Part-time and full-time paid employment spells of only salary workers are taken into consideration. The 
spells of occupational experience do not necessarily have to be continuous. Missing values have been imputed based on 
a regression model of the length of accumulated occupational-specific experience (available upon request).  
viii Heckman (1981) had initially proposed as a solution to the initial conditions problem the specification of a linearized 
reduced form equation for the initial period. However, this method requires a set of exogenous instruments for 
identification of the full observed sequence (𝑦𝑖1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑡) given 𝑥𝑖 . In contrast, Wooldridge’s (2005) suggestion of 
modeling the density of (𝑦𝑖2, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑡) conditional on (𝑦𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖) minimizes both the estimation complexity and the 
computational cost (Stewart, 2007, p. 516). 
ix Other related procedures that have been suggested to tackle the above econometric problem include Kyriazidou (1997) 
and Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).  Applications of these methods can also be found in Jones and Labeaga 
(2003) and Jackle (2007). 
x Due to the absence of any theoretical justification, no dynamic terms were used in this model. 
xi The joint effect is calculated as a point estimate and standard error of the linear constraint that the summation of the 
level and the mean effect is equal to zero, for each of the variables in the Mundlak terms separately. The calculated 
permanent effects are identical to those obtained from a model that incorporates the difference between the yearly and 
the average values of the independent variables, along with their average values in the specification. 
xii Previous research finds that the overtime premium has an ambiguous effect on the probability of moonlighting 
(Renna, 2006). 
xiii Specifications controlling for job security render an insignificant impact on the probability to moonlight (both when 
included jointly and separately with job satisfaction; available upon request). 
xiv An alternative model specification was also employed, where controls for education were not included in the 
regression to avoid potential collinearity with the occupational variables. No notable changes in effects were observed.  
xv  For robustness purposes a Probit model and a Random Effects Probit model (with no selection correction) have also 
been estimated.  The results remain fairly similar across the different estimation procedures, so discussion only of the 
Linear Probability model is provided in the main text.  The regression output of the alternative empirical procedures is 
available from the authors upon request. 
xvi In this study, we embark based on the view that occupation codes have the advantage over industry codes of being 
more closely related to tasks, recognising however that they also have their own problems as a basis for defining specific 
human capital. This line of analysis is also a necessity based on the lack of available SIC data for moonlighters at the 
BHPS. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009b) argue that the evidence for industry specific capital is misleading and that 
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specificity resides exclusively in occupational categories, with no role for either industry or firm. On the other hand, Neal 
(1995) and Parent (2000) provide evidence to suggest that industry specificity is much more important than firm 
specificity. Pavan (2011) argues that the relative roles of industry and occupation remain unclear. Recent studies based 
on data on job tasks have enabled a more direct approach in the measurement of occupational distance. These newer 
measures incorporate the fact that different occupations report similar bundles of tasks or skills. The higher the overlap 
in the task or skill portfolio of two occupations, the more related the occupations are considered to be. Among such 
measures are those proposed by Poletaev and Robinson (2008), Robinson (2010), Geel and Backes‐Gellner (2009), and 
Gathmann and Schönberg (2010). The generation of data on job tasks for occupations in the United Kingdom and the 
generation of more specific occupational distance measures provide interesting avenues of future research.  
xvii This estimation methodology is considered superior to other alternatives, such as the multinomial probit model. The 
latter would cater for simultaneous choice between mutually exclusive options. However, that model does not allow the 
incorporation of individual random effects. Nonetheless, the results and interpretations from the separate four 
regressions shown in the next section are robust even when using a multinomial probit model (available from the 
authors upon request).  
xviii All estimates can be made available from the authors upon request. Some interesting results emerge from the 
analysis. Higher job satisfaction reduces the probability to move into self-employment, a new job or a new position. 
Furthermore, individuals with lengthier accumulated seniority and labour market experience are less likely to exhibit any 
kind of job mobility.  Interestingly, job mobility appears to be a response to the hours-constraints individual face in their 
primary job. Also, the sector and contract of employment, as well as the promotion and salary prospects, and the travel 
to work time are estimated to play a significant role in job mobility outcomes.   
xix The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for the comments provided on this issue.  
xx The exclusion restriction variables used for identification are:  private sector, permanent job, promotion prospects in 
primary job, travel to work time and annual increments.  Limited evidence of sample selection bias is found, with the 
inverse Mills ratio negative and significant only for those who get a new position.  This suggests that the characteristics 
that make individuals more likely to get a new position with their current employer makes them less likely also to do a 
different occupation in that new position.  
xxi Due to space limitations we refrain from an extensive discussion of the remaining results, though some findings merit 
further attention. Individuals with lengthier occupation-specific experience are estimated to be less likely to change 
occupations in their new primary job.  This is a finding that one would expect a priori, since individuals are expected to 
enjoy larger wage premiums by performing tasks on which they have already accumulated the necessary skills and 
experience.  Also, those with higher seniority in their primary job at period t are more likely to do a different occupation 
when they get a new job or position at period t+1.  This may capture the effect of accumulated seniority on the 
probability of being promoted. Also, higher job satisfaction in the previous primary job are estimated to reduce the 
probability of changing occupation once a job transition has taken place.   
xxii We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this very useful comment.  
xxiii Specifically, skilled non-manual occupations comprise of the following SOC codes: 1 (Managers & administrators), 2 
(Professional), 5 (Craft & related) Skilled manual occupations comprise of the occupations in code 3 (Associate 
professional & technical). Unskilled non-manual occupations are those of the codes 4 (Clerical & secretarial), 6 (Personal 
& protective service), 7 (Sales), and unskilled manual are the codes 8 (Plant & machine operatives) and 9 (Other 
occupations).  
 
 
 
